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Innovation and Production in the Global Economy†
By Costas Arkolakis, Natalia Ramondo, Andrés  Rodríguez-Clare,  
and Stephen Yeaple*
We develop a quantifiable general equilibrium model of trade and 
multinational production (MP) in which countries can specialize 
in innovation or production. Home market effects or comparative 
advantage leads some countries to specialize in innovation and 
relegate manufacturing operations to other countries via outward 
MP. Counterfactual analysis reveals that the reduction in the cost 
of MP or the integration of China into the world economy may hurt 
countries that are driven to specialize in production, although these 
losses tend to be very small. Contrary to popular fears, production 
workers gain even in countries that further specialize in innovation. (JEL D58, F12, F14, F23, L60, O31)
One consequence of globalization, and in particular the rise of multinational pro-
duction (MP), is that goods are increasingly being produced far from where ideas 
are created. International specialization in innovation and production is clearly evi-
dent in the aggregate data. Figure 1 shows that the most innovative OECD countries, 
as measured by R&D expenditures in manufacturing relative to local  value-added, 
are home to multinationals whose foreign affiliate sales exceed the sales of foreign 
multinational affiliates in their country. With increasing globalization, this pattern 
has become more pronounced over time. Figure 2 shows that R&D expenditures rel-
ative to manufacturing  value-added in the United States has grown from 8.7 percent 
in 1999 to 12.7 percent in 2009. Over the same period, US firms have increased the 
share of their total global employment that is located in their foreign affiliates from 
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22 to 31 percent. This is, thanks in large part, due to an increasing presence in China, 
which now accounts for one in eight employees of the foreign affiliates of US firms.
Being a recent phenomenon, specialization in production or innovation raises a host 
of concerns. Countries that specialize in production worry that low innovation will 
damage their growth prospects, while countries that specialize in innovation worry 
that this specialization pattern will reduce the availability of good  middle-income 
jobs. Viewed from the perspective of the standard  two-sector trade theory, concerns 
about specialization in production may seem misguided, since specialization would 
reflect comparative advantage and bring about efficiency gains. But there are two 
reasons why it is legitimate to worry about specialization in production as opposed 
to innovation. First, the expansion of production could trigger a deterioration of a 
country’s terms of trade. Second, innovation is an  increasing-returns-to-scale activ-
ity, so that standard reasoning based on comparative advantage is insufficient. In 
particular, the combination of fixed costs of innovation and frictions to the move-
ment of ideas across borders leads to  home-market effects (HMEs) in innovation, 
and, as shown by Venables (1987), specialization induced by HMEs could lead to 
 non-standard welfare effects.
In this paper we develop a quantifiable,  multi-country  general equilibrium model 
of trade and MP that captures these forces in a rich geographic setting. We use the 
model to quantify the welfare implications of shocks driving increased specializa-
tion in innovation and production, including a generalized reduction in the cost of 
transferring technologies across borders, the integration of China into the global 
economy, and the impact of selective integration or breakups between countries.
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Figure 1. R&D and Net Multinational Production
Notes: R&D expenditure in manufacturing, as a share of  value-added, is from OECD STAN for 1999. Net MP is 
defined as outward affiliate sales–inward affiliate sales divided by their sum, an average over  1996–2001, from 
Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Tintelnot (2015).
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Following Melitz (2003), we model innovation as the creation of heterogeneous 
firms that sell differentiated goods in monopolistically competitive markets sepa-
rated by fixed and variable trade costs. We depart from the Melitz model by assum-
ing that firms can locate production outside of their home market and assume that 
firm productivity levels across locations are drawn from a multivariate distribution. 
Firms face a tradeoff in choosing where to produce for any particular market; they 
could locate production close to their customers to avoid trade costs or they could 
locate where production costs are lower. By allowing firms to produce outside of 
their home country, MP allows some countries to specialize in innovation and oth-
ers to specialize in production, with profits flowing from producing to innovating 
countries to compensate for the cost of innovation.1 Loosely speaking, innovative 
countries export ideas and import goods.
The model provides a natural framework to explore the implications of open-
ness to trade and MP. We find that countries that specialize in innovation tend to 
realize larger gains from openness than implied by current models (e.g., Ramondo 
and  Rodríguez-Clare 2013), while countries that are most at risk from adverse wel-
fare effects are those that experience a contraction of innovation. In addition, by 
allowing for worker heterogeneity in their skills for innovation and production as in 
1 In the absence of MP, the share of labor devoted to innovation would be the same in all countries. This is 
consistent with the version of the Melitz model presented in Arkolakis et al. (2008), where entry is endogenous, but 
not affected by trade costs. An equivalent result is derived by Eaton and Kortum (2001) in a setting with Bertrand 
competition. 
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Figure 2. Manufacturing R&D and Employment of US Multinational Firms
Notes: R&D data are from OECD STAN and US multinational firms data are Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
employment share for US affiliates abroad is defined as total employment of US  majority-owned manufacturing 
affiliates abroad, divided by total US manufacturing employment, plus US  majority-owned manufacturing affiliates 
abroad, minus the employment of the affiliates of  foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates operating in the United 
States.
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Roy (1951), openness to trade and MP not only alters the distribution of income in 
 intuitive ways but can lead to a loss of welfare for some workers even as the coun-
try’s aggregate real income increases. This result resonates with the popular fear 
that the real wage of production workers in innovative countries such as the United 
States may fall as multinational firms move production abroad.
The quantitative analysis starts by deriving and testing a novel implication of our 
model, namely that trade flows restricted to the parents and affiliates of firms from a 
given country are more sensitive to trade costs than overall trade flows. Using  high 
quality data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on the sales of US firms 
and their foreign affiliates, we estimate restricted and standard gravity equations and 
find that the trade elasticities are consistent with this prediction. These two elastici-
ties will also serve as key targets in our calibration.
The model is calibrated using trade, MP, and production data for 26 countries. 
We identify the full set of trade and MP frictions between countries and a vector of 
parameters that govern comparative advantage by fitting aggregate bilateral trade 
and MP data under the assumptions that all trade and MP frictions are symmetric 
between pairs of countries. Intuitively, specialization in innovation or production 
that cannot be explained by geography is due to comparative advantage.2
We use the calibrated model to perform several counterfactual exercises. First, 
we consider a 5 percent reduction in all MP costs from their calibrated levels. 
This reduction results in greater specialization across countries in innovation and 
production and real incomes rise on average by about 2 percent. Only one of the 
countries that experience a decline in innovation suffers welfare losses, and they 
are very small. Contrary to popular fears, we find that production workers gain 
everywhere, and it is innovation workers who experience losses in countries that 
face a contraction in their innovation sector. Second, we explore the implications 
of the integration of China to the world economy. The result is that countries with 
good ties to China such as Japan and the United States follow what we could refer 
to as the “Apple model”: they specialize in innovation while China becomes their 
manufacturing hub. Countries that specialize further in innovation experience over-
all gains, and production workers share in those gains, although by much less than 
innovation workers. Finally, to explore the consequences of Brexit, we consider 
an increase in trade and MP costs between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, and to explore President Trump’s suggestion of increasing taxes on firms 
that move part of their production abroad, we consider an increase in outward MP 
costs for US firms.
The mechanisms at work in our model have antecedents in the classic work on 
trade and MP (see Markusen 2002). This literature highlights four key ideas: (i) MP 
allows innovation (entry) to be geographically separated from production; (ii) coun-
tries differ in their relative costs of innovation and production, which leads to spe-
cialization in one of these two activities; (iii) the  non-rivalry of technology within 
the firm allows  multi-plant production; and (iv) trade costs encourage, while MP 
2 In this paper we focus on MP as the vehicle through which international specialization takes place, but there 
are alternative arrangements, such as the licensing of technology and other contractual relationships such as out-
sourcing that do not involve ownership. Our model is consistent with these mechanisms, but because there is little 
data on arm’s length offshoring we can only measure the offshoring done within multinational firms. 
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costs discourage,  multi-plant production. The incorporation of these features into 
a  general-equilibrium trade model dates back to Helpman (1984) and Markusen 
(1984).3 By modeling  firm-level productivity in different countries as coming from 
a multivariate distribution and by replacing  plant-level fixed costs with marketing 
fixed costs, we gain the ability to construct a tractable, quantifiable, and  multi-country 
general equilibrium model that incorporates the most important mechanisms found 
in this earlier work. Although adding  plant-level fixed costs to our model is beyond 
the scope of this paper, in the robustness section we argue that their presence should 
not substantially affect our qualitative results (i.e., cross country patterns) and we 
offer some thoughts on the implications they would have for the quantitative effects 
(i.e.,  cross-country averages).
Our paper is closely related to a recent literature on trade and MP. Ramondo and 
 Rodríguez-Clare (2013) also have a probabilistic representation of  multi-country 
productivity and a large number of countries, allowing for counterfactual analy-
sis in a rich geographic setting. The key difference is that there is no innovation 
in their  perfectly-competitive model. Our  monopolistic-competition framework 
is also related to a recent paper by Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013), 
which is the quantitative application of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). They 
focus on understanding the frictions that rationalize the export versus MP decisions 
of Norwegian firms, but abstract from “ export-platform MP” (any market can be 
served only from a local affiliate or by exports from the firm’s home country) and 
fix firm innovation locations and country wages by assumption. With a probabilis-
tic structure similar to ours, Tintelnot (2017) allows for  export-platform MP in a 
 general-equilibrium model, although again in this setting there is no innovation as 
firm entry is exogenous.
Our paper is also related to a literature that considers the movement of mana-
gerial or knowledge capital from one country to another, interpreted as MP, while 
trade takes place only as a way to transfer the returns to capital (see, for example, 
Burstein and  Monge-Naranjo 2009; McGrattan and Prescott 2010; McGrattan 2012; 
and Ramondo 2014).4 The simplification on the trade dimension in these papers 
allows for a more detailed modeling of the effect of specific policies, such as taxes 
on profits of foreign owned firms, as well as the transition path as countries open up 
to MP. Because they do not allow for increasing returns and frictions to trade and 
MP, these papers have nothing to say about bilateral trade and MP flows or about the 
role of HMEs and their related welfare implications.
Finally, by distinguishing between innovation and production activities, we make 
contact with a body of theory that emphasizes the effect of offshoring on the set of 
activities done within a country and on real wages (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1999; 
3 Examples of work that most closely resembles our own are Markusen and Venables (1998) and Markusen 
and Venables (2000) in which the authors analyze the interaction between comparative advantage in production 
and innovation, trade costs, and plant and corporate fixed costs in a  two-country,  Heckscher-Ohlin-like setting. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) extend this framework to an endogenous growth setting in which the more efficient 
use of the world’s resources made possible by MP may affect the  long-run growth rate in rich and poor countries. 
 Non-homothetic preferences together with home market effects determine specialization and foreign investment 
patterns in  high-quality or low quality goods in Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2015). 
4 Recent papers that present stylized models of innovation versus production are Eaton and Kortum (2007) and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2010). In principle, these models could be adapted for quantitative analysis but this task has not 
been undertaken so far. 
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Grossman and  Rossi-Hansberg 2008; and  Rodríguez-Clare 2010). By considering 
the impact of China’s integration into world markets, our paper also makes  contact 
with an empirical literature that has documented the negative effect of Chinese 
manufacturing exports on the employment and wages of manufacturing workers in 
developed countries (e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013).
I. The Model
We consider a world economy comprised of  i = 1, …, N countries; one factor 
of production, labor; and a continuum of goods indexed by  ω ∈ Ω . Preferences are 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with elasticity of substitution  σ > 1 . The 
associated price index is given by
(1)  P i =  ( ∫ ω∈Ω    p i  (ω) 1−σ dω)  
1 _ 
1−σ , 
where  p i (ω) is the price of good  ω in country  i .
Each good  ω is potentially produced by a single firm under monopolistic compe-
tition. Firms can produce anywhere in the world with varying productivity levels as 
specified below. To the extent possible, we use index  i to denote the firm’s country 
of origin (the source of the idea), index  l to denote the location of production, and 
index  n to denote the country where the firm sells its product. Firms that export 
from  l to country  n incur a marketing fixed cost  F n in units of labor in the destination 
country, and an iceberg transportation cost  τ ln ≥ 1 with  τ nn = 1 . Firms originated in 
country  i that produce in country  l incur a productivity loss that we model as iceberg 
bilateral MP costs,  γ il ≥ 1 , with  γ ll = 1 . These costs are meant to capture various 
impediments that multinationals face when operating in a different economic, legal 
or social environment, as well as the various costs of technology transfer incurred 
by multinationals in different production locations.
A firm from origin  i can serve destination  n by (i) producing in  i and exporting 
to country  n ; by (ii) opening an affiliate in country  l ≠ i, n and exporting from there 
to country  n ; or by (iii) opening an affiliate in  n and selling the good locally. Firms 
use constant returns to scale technologies, with the marginal product of labor being 
firm and location specific. Formally, a firm is characterized by a productivity vec-
tor  z = ( z 1 ,  z 2 , …,  z N ) , where  z l determines the firm’s productivity if it decides to 
produce in country  l . These productivity vectors are allowed to vary across firms, 
leading firms to make different choices regarding their production locations. Note 
that all heterogeneity across firms is associated with differences in the productivity 
vector  z , while the trade and MP costs,  { τ ln } and  { γ il } , as well as wages (introduced 
below), are common across firms.
We think of innovation as the process of creating differentiated goods, each one 
produced by a  single-product firm, and assume that doing so requires  f  i e units of 
labor. If  L i e units of labor are allocated to the innovation sector in country  i , then the 
measure of goods created in that country is  M i =  L i e / f  i e . Although this entails only 
product innovation, it is easy to extend the model to allow for process innovation 
in such a way that none of the results that we focus on are affected. As we show in 
the online Appendix, if entrants can augment the expected productivity of the firms 
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they create by a proportion  a at a cost that is a power function of  a , then part of the 
total innovation investment will be devoted to good creation, and part to making 
firms more productive, with this breakdown of innovation into product and process 
innovation being invariant to trade and MP.5
There are  L ̅i workers in country  i . Workers are immobile across countries but 
mobile across different activities (i.e., innovation, production, and marketing) 
within each country. We assume that workers are heterogeneous in their abili-
ties across these activities. Each worker is characterized by a productivity vector 
 v ≡  ( v e ,  v p ) , where  v e represents the number of units of labor that the worker can 
supply to innovation and  v p represents the number of units of labor that the worker 
can supply to production or marketing. Workers can choose to work in innovation, 
where the wage per efficiency unit of labor is  w i e , or production/marketing, where 
the wage per efficiency unit of labor is  w i p . A worker with productivity vector  v 
would work in the innovation sector if and only if  v e  w i e ≥  v p  w i p . 
A. Firm’s Optimization
In this environment, firms face a simple optimization problem. First, for each 
market  n , a firm finds the cheapest location from where to serve that market. Second, 
the firm decides what price to charge. Given our assumption on preferences, firms 
simply set prices equal to  mark-up  σ ̃ ≡ σ/ (σ − 1) over marginal cost. Letting ξ iln ≡  γ il  w l p  τ ln , the marginal cost of a firm from  i producing in location  l to serve 
market  n is  C iln ≡  ξ iln / z l , and hence the price charged in market  n by a firm from  i is
(2)  p in =  σ ̃  min l  C iln . 
In Figure 3, we summarize how the price charged by a firm is determined by factors 
that are firm specific, i.e., the firm’s productivity vector  z , and by factors that depend 
on the country of origin, location of production, and final sales. Third, the firm cal-
culates the associated profits. If those profits are higher than the fixed marketing cost 
then the firm chooses to serve the market. Letting  X n be total expenditure in country 
n , the maximum unit cost under which variable profits in market  n are enough to 
cover the fixed cost  w n p  F n is defined by
(3)  c n ∗ ≡  ( σ  w n 
p  F n  _ X n  ) 
1/(1−σ)
   P n  __ σ ̃  . 
B. Aggregation
Although the problem for each firm is simple, our goal is to obtain analytic 
expressions for the aggregate variables that we can relate to the data while retain-
ing key features of previous theories of international trade. To do so, we consider 
5 Our model ignores innovation performed by multinationals’ foreign affiliates (see Fan 2017 for an extension 
of our model to R&D offshoring). This assumption seems reasonable given that most of the R&D is still done in 
the multinationals’ home country. For example, according to BEA data for 2009, the parents of US multinationals 
accounted for 85 percent of its total R&D expenditure but only 70 percent of its  value-added. See also Bilir and 
Morales (2016), which concludes that the parent R&D is a substantially more important determinant of firm per-
formance than affiliate R&D. 
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a  multivariate extension of the univariate Pareto distribution used in the Chaney 
(2008) version of Melitz (2003).
We assume that the productivity vector of firms in country  i is randomly drawn 
from the multivariate distribution given by
(4)  Pr(  Z 1 ≤  z 1 , …,  Z N ≤  z N )  =  G i (  z 1 , …,  z N )  = 1 −  ( ∑ l=1
N
  [ T il  z l −θ ]  
1 _ 
1−ρ ) 
1−ρ
 , 
with support  z l ≥  T ̃ i  1/θ for all  l , where  T ̃i ≡  [ ∑ l   T il 1/ (1−ρ)  ] 
1−ρ
 ,  ρ ∈ [0, 1) , and 
θ > max (1, σ − 1) .6 Several comments are in order regarding the properties 
of this distribution. First, the marginal distributions have Pareto tails; that is, for 
z l ≥ a >  T ̃  i 1/θ we have  Pr ( Z l ≥  z l |  Z l ≥ a )  =  (  z l / a) −θ . Second,  max (  Z 1 , …,  Z N ) 
is distributed Pareto with shape parameter  θ and scale parameter  T ̃  i 1/θ , while 
the joint probability that  arg  max j  Z j = l and  Z l ≥ z for  z >  T ̃ i 1/θ is given by 
 ( T il / T ̃i ) 1/(1−ρ)  T ̃i  z −θ . Third, if  ρ → 1 the elements of  ( Z 1 ,  Z 2 , …,  Z N ) are pairwise 
6 This distribution can be seen as a reformulation of an Archimedean copula of Pareto distributions. Specifically, 
the Archimedean copula 4.2.2 in Nielsen (2006) leads to the same function for the distribution as (4) in the 
 two-dimensional case if  z 1 and  z 2 are each distributed Pareto, except that the support would be implicitly defined 
by  (  T 1  z 1 −θ )  1 _ 1−ρ +  (  T 2  z 2 −θ )  1 _ 1−ρ ≤ 1 . This distribution cannot be directly extended to  N ≥ 3 because the copula is 
not strict (see Nielsen 2006). Instead, we modify the support of the distribution to make it an  N-box defined by 
z l ≥  T  ̃i 1/θ for all  l . For a proof that (4) satisfies the requirements to be a distribution function as well as a detailed 
discussion of its properties see Arkolakis, Rodríguez-Clare, and Su (2017). 
i
l
n
γil τln
Innovation
w e
i
f e
i
→(z1,…,zN) Consumption price = σ γilwpl τlnzl
Production cost = γil w pl
z
l
Figure 3. Firm Costs and Pricing Behavior
Notes: Innovation is done in country  i at cost  w i 
e   f i 
  e ; production is done in country  l at unit cost  γ il  w l p / z l ; and con-
sumption is done in country  n at price  σ ̃  γ il  w l p  τ ln / z l .
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perfectly correlated. Finally, the case with  ρ = 0 is equivalent to simply having the 
production location  l chosen randomly with probabilities  T il /  T ̃i among all possible 
locations  l = 1, …, N , and the productivity  Z l drawn from the Pareto distribution 
1 −  T ̃i  z l −θ with  z l ≥  T  ̃ i 1/θ . Figure 4 illustrates how the distribution depends on the 
value of  ρ .
For the reminder of the paper, we make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1:  T il =  T i e  T  l p .
This assumption is without loss of generality because variation in MP flows 
across country pairs can be equivalently generated by  T il or by  γ il ; we simply choose 
to load all of this on  γ il . The assumption implies that  T ̃i =  ( ∑ l   ( T  l p) 1/ (1−ρ)  ) 1/ (1−ρ)   T i e , 
so that we can think of  T i e as a measure of the quality of ideas in country  i , or pro-
ductivity in innovation. In turn,  T  l p determines country  l ’s productivity in produc-
tion.7 We will continue to write  T il rather than  T i e  T  l p for notational convenience. 
Since  T i e and  f  i e will have equivalent effects on all relevant equilibrium variables, we 
henceforth assume that  f  i e =  f  e for all  i .
To guarantee that for all pairs  {i, n} there are firms from  i that will decide not to 
serve market  n , we assume that the parameters of the model (e.g., marketing costs) 
are such that the level of  c n ∗ is low enough. Formally, we make the following assump-
tion, which we maintain throughout the rest of the paper.
ASSUMPTION 2:  ξ iln >  T  ̃i  1/θ  c n ∗, for all  i, l, n. 
7 This setup easily allows for splitting countries without affecting the equilibrium. For example, we could split 
country  l into two countries,  l 1 and  l 2 , with  T  l j  e =  T l e and  ( T   l j  p) 1/ (1−ρ)  /  L ̅ l j  =  ( T  l p) 1/ (1−ρ)  /  L ̅l for  j = 1, 2 . One can 
show that if there are no costs to trade and MP between  l 1 and  l 2 then the equilibrium is not affected by the split (the 
proof is available upon request). 
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Figure 4. Multivariate Pareto: Simulated Draws
Note: Simulation for 100,000 draws,  N = 2 ,  θ = 4 , and  T 1 =  T 2 .
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The multivariate Pareto distribution together with this assumption allows us to 
characterize several important objects in the model, starting from the probability 
that a firm serves a particular market from a certain production location at a unit cost 
below some  c , and the probability that firms from  i serving market  n decide to do so 
from production location  l .
LEMMA 1: The (unconditional) probability that a firm from  i will serve market  n 
from  l at cost lower than  c, for  c ≤  c n ∗, is
(5)  Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l  ∩  min k  C ikn ≤ c) =  ψ iln  Ψ in  c 
θ , 
where
  Ψ in ≡  [ ∑ k  ( T ik  ξ ikn −θ) 
 1 _ 
1−ρ ] 
1−ρ
 and  ψ iln ≡  ( T il  ξ iln −θ /  Ψ in )  1 _ 1−ρ , 
while the (conditional) probability that firms from  i serving market  n will choose 
location  l for production is
(6)  Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l |  min k  C ikn ≤  c n 
∗) =  ψ iln . 
PROOF:
See Appendix A.
We use this Lemma to analyze the model’s implications for aggregate trade and 
MP flows. Let  M i denote the measure of firms in country  i ,  M iln denote the measure 
of firms from  i that serve market  n from location  l , and  X iln denote the total value of 
the associated sales. Using the pricing rule in ( 2 ) and the  cut-off rule in  (3) , we can 
compute  X iln by using ( 5 ) to obtain
(7)  X iln =  ψ iln  λ in E  X n , 
where
(8)  λ in E ≡   ∑ l 
  X iln  _____ X n  =  
 M i  Ψ in  ________  ∑ k    M k  Ψ kn ,
is the share of total expenditure in country  n devoted to goods produced by firms 
from  i (irrespective of where they are produced). The measure of firms behind these 
sales is
(9)  M iln =  θ − σ + 1 _σθ  
 X iln  _  w n p  F n . 
Aggregate flows  X iln can be used to construct trade and MP shares. In partic-
ular, trade shares are given by expenditure shares across production locations, 
 λ ln T ≡  ∑ i   X iln /  ∑ i, k    X ikn , while MP shares are given by production shares across 
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firms from different origins,  λ il M ≡  ∑ n    X iln /  ∑ j, n    X jln . Letting  Y l ≡  ∑ i, n    X iln denote 
the value of all goods produced in country  l , recalling that  X n ≡  ∑ i, l    X iln is total 
expenditure by consumers in country  n , and using expression  (7) , trade and MP 
shares can be written more succinctly as
(10)  λ ln T ≡  ∑ 
i
   X iln  _ X n  =  ∑ i  ψ iln  λ in E ,  
and
(11)  λ il M ≡  ∑ 
n
   X iln  _ Y l  =  
 ∑ n    ψ iln  λ in E  X n   _________ Y l  . 
Let  Π iln denote aggregate profits associated with sales  X iln , net of fixed market-
ing costs, but gross of entry costs. Given CES preferences, variable profits asso-
ciated with  X iln are  X iln /σ . The total fixed marketing costs paid by these firms are 
 w n p  F n  M iln . Using these two expressions and  (9) , we obtain
(12)  Π iln = η  X iln , 
where  η ≡ 1 / (θ σ ̃) . Therefore, total profits made in country  l are a constant share of 
the value of production in country  l , i.e.,  ∑ i, n    Π iln = η  Y l .
We now turn to the aggregation across heterogeneous workers’ choices regarding 
their labor supply. We assume that each worker’s endowment of units of labor in 
innovation and production/marketing,  v e and  v p , are obtained as transformations of 
an independently and identically distributed random variable drawn from a Fréchet 
distribution, similar to Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Hsieh et al. (2013). More 
specifically,  v e =  u e / Γ(1 − 1 / κ) and  v p =  u p / Γ(1 − 1 / κ) , with  u e and  u p both 
drawn independently from the distribution  exp [− u −κ ] , where  κ > 1 and where Γ( ∙ ) is the Gamma function.8 From the properties of the Fréchet distribution, this 
implies that the supply of labor units to innovation and production/marketing activ-
ities in country  i are given by
(13)  L i e =  L ̅i  [1 +  (  w i e  _ w i p ) 
−κ
 ] 
1/κ−1
 ,  
and
(14)  L i p =  L ̅i  [1 +  (  w i e  _ w i p ) 
κ
 ] 
1/κ−1
 ,  
respectively. For future purposes, note that  L i e and  L i p depend on the ratio  w i e / w i p . 
The parameter  κ captures the extent to which workers differ in their relative pro-
ductivities in the two activities. The case of perfect mobility (or, homogeneous 
8 We divide by  Γ(1 − 1 / κ) so that when we take the limit when  κ → 1 the aggregates defined below do not 
blow up to infinity. 
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workers) obtains in the limit as  κ → ∞ , while the case of no mobility across sectors 
obtains in the limit as  κ → 1 , as discussed further below.
The following remark is important for the interpretation of our quantitative exer-
cises. Changes in  w i e and  w i p are fully reflected in the income levels for workers 
that stay in their sectors. For instance, if  w i e / w i p increases, workers in the innova-
tion sector will all stay and they will gain according to the change in  w i e / P i , while 
the workers in the production sector that decide to stay in their sector will gain 
according to the change in  w i p / P i . The workers that switch from the production to 
the innovation sector will fare better; in particular, the marginal worker will gain 
according to changes in  w e / P i . In our quantitative exercises, we implicitly focus on 
the workers that do not switch.9
C. Equilibrium
We start by considering the labor market clearing conditions in production/ 
marketing and then in innovation. Labor demand (in value) for production and 
marketing in country  l is  Y l / σ ̃ and  (1 − η − 1 / σ ̃)  X l , respectively. Using 
 Y l =  ∑ n    λ ln T  X n , we can then write the labor market clearing condition for workers in 
production/marketing in country  i as
(15)  1 __ σ ̃  ∑ n  λ ln T  X n +  (1 − η −  1 __ σ ̃)  X l =  w  l pL  l p. 
To write the labor market clearing condition in innovation, note that profits net of 
marketing costs but gross of entry costs in country  i are  ∑ l, n    Π iln . Since the cost of 
entry is simply given by labor hired for innovation, the  zero-profit condition implies 
that we can think of  ∑ l, n    Π iln as labor demand (in value) for innovation. Using ( 8 ) 
and ( 12 ) we can then write the  labor-market clearing condition for workers in inno-
vation in country  i as
(16)  η  ∑ 
n
  λ in E  X n =  w i e  L i e . 
We allow for aggregate trade and MP imbalances via exogenous international trans-
fers  Δ i as in Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008), with  ∑ i   Δ i = 0 .10 Together with 
zero profits, the budget balance condition is
(17)  w i p  L i p +  w i e  L i e +  Δ i =  X i . 
Using ( 13 ),  (14) , and  (17) to substitute for  L i e ,  L i P , and  X i in terms of wages,  (15) and (16) constitute a system of  2N equations that can be used to solve for the equilibrium 
wages  w p ,  w e (up to a constant determined by the numeraire).
9 We do not want to use the average income of workers in a sector to compute welfare of workers originally in 
one sector or another, because the group of workers changes, making the comparison meaningless. 
10 We use the expression “aggregate trade and MP imbalances” rather than current account imbalances for two 
reasons. First, because international transfers are included in the current account and hence would not lead to cur-
rent account imbalances in equilibrium. Second, and more importantly, because in the quantitative analysis below 
we do not use data on current account imbalances to measure  Δ i and instead do so by using the calibrated model 
combined with net trade and MP flows. 
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It is worth noting that marketing fixed cost parameters,  F n , do not enter the equi-
librium equations (assuming that they are high enough that Assumption 2 holds). 
The reason is that they affect all origins equally and hence do not affect labor 
demand for production or innovation across countries. Of course, although these 
fixed costs do not affect relative wages, they do affect variety and welfare in each 
country.
Equation  (17) is one of the basic National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
identities, namely that (in the absence of  current-account imbalances, as we are 
assuming here) income equals expenditure adjusted by trade and MP imbalances. 
The other NIPA identity is that income equals output; this is obtained by adding up 
(15) and  (16) , which yields
(18)  w l p  L i p +  w i e  L i e =  1 __ σ ̃  Y i +  (1 − η −  1 __ σ ̃)  X i + η  ∑ n  λ in E  X n . 
The first term on the  right-hand-side is the value of domestic production net of the 
associated variable profits, the second term is the value of marketing services, and 
the last term denotes profits gross of entry cost. The sum of these three terms is 
national output. Note also that from  (15) ,  (16) , and  (17) , and using  (12) , we see that
(19)  Δ i =  X i −  Y i +  (1 − η −  1 __ σ ̃)  ( Y i −  X i ) +  ∑ j, n  Π jin −  ∑ l, n  Π iln . 
This says that the aggregate trade and MP deficit ( Δ i ) equals the goods trade deficit 
plus the deficit in marketing services plus net profit outflows.
A key concept in the rest of the paper is the share of income earned in 
the  innovation sector (henceforth, simply denoted as the innovation share), 
 r i ≡  w i e  L i e / ( w i  p  L i p +  w i e  L i e ) , which is also equal to  r i =  ∑ l, n    Π iln /(  X i −  Δ i ) . 
Rearranging  (15) and using  (17) we get
(20)  r i (1 −   Δ i  _ X i  ) − η =  1 __ σ ̃(  X i −  Y i   X i  ) −   Δ i  _ X i  . 
Therefore, the innovation share is directly related to the trade deficit,  X i −  Y i and the 
aggregate trade and MP deficit. With no deficits (i.e.,  Δ i = 0 ) this collapses to the 
simple expression
(21)  r i − η =  1 __ σ ̃(  X i −  Y i   X i  ) . 
In the two extreme cases of infinite MP costs or infinite trade costs, we must have 
X i =  Y i and, thus  r i = η . The first case is discussed in more detail below.
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For future reference, note also that, from  (13),  (14) , we must have
(22)   w i e  _ w i p =  ( 
 r i  _ 
1 −  r i ) 
 1 _κ . 
This is intuitive: a higher innovation share requires a higher wage in innovation 
relative to production/marketing to induce the necessary reallocation of workers.11 
Moreover, plugging this relative wage into (13) yields  L i e =  r i 1−1/κ  L ̅i , and hence
(23)  M i =  r i 1−1/κ  L ̅i /  f  e , 
so that the measure of firms created is an increasing function of the innovation share.
D. Special Cases
In this subsection, we explore a number of special cases of the model that we can 
characterize analytically. These cases illustrate how, in the presence of MP, compar-
ative advantage and home market effects (HME) determine whether countries spe-
cialize in innovation or production. They also shed light on the basic forces behind 
the results of our quantitative analysis in Section III. For the rest of this section, we 
assume no international transfers, i.e.,  Δ i = 0 for all  i .
Infinite MP Costs: A World without MP.—It is instructive to consider the case in 
which MP costs are infinite, i.e.,  γ il → ∞ for all  i ≠ l . This restriction implies that 
expenditure shares are equal to trade shares,  λ in E =  λ in T , and that
(24)  λ in T =   M i  T ii  ( w i 
p  τ in ) −θ   ______________  ∑ k    M k  T kk  ( w k p  τ kn ) −θ 
, 
which is the same expression as in the Chaney (2008) version of the Melitz model. 
The equilibrium conditions further imply that  r i = η for all  i , that relative wages 
are given by  
 w i e  __ w i p =  ( 
η ____ 1 − η) 
 1 _κ , that the total amount of labor supplied to innovation is 
L i e =  L ̅i  η 1−1/κ , and that
  M i =  ~ Mi ≡  η 1−1/κ  L ̅i /  f   e . 
This implies that innovation is proportional to country size. Note that if  κ → ∞ 
then  L i e = η  L ̅i , so that a share  η of (homogeneous) workers are employed in inno-
vation – this is the same expression as the one derived by Arkolakis et al. (2008) in 
a Melitz model with endogenous entry.12
11 In the case of homogeneous workers (i.e.,  κ → ∞ ), an interior equilibrium (i.e., with  r i ∈ (0, 1) ) requires 
wage equalization between innovation and production/marketing,  w i e =  w i p . 
12 An equivalent result is derived by Eaton and Kortum (2001) in a setting with Bertrand competition. 
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A Frictionless World: The Role of Comparative Advantage.—We now discuss the 
role of comparative advantage in leading to specialization in innovation or produc-
tion. To make the analysis tractable, we focus on the case with homogenous work-
ers (i.e.,  κ → ∞ ) in a frictionless world (i.e.,  τ ln = 1 and  γ il = 1 , for all  i, l, n ). 
Let  A i ≡  ( T  i p ) 1/ (1−ρ)  /  L ̅i be an index for a country’s productivity in production and δ i ≡  L ̅i  T i e / ∑ k    L ̅k  T k e be a measure of relative country size. The equilibrium condi-
tions for this case lead to the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: Consider a frictionless world with homogenous workers (i.e., 
κ → ∞ ). Assume that, for all  i ,
(25)  1 −  (1 − η)  σ ̃ <   A i / ( T  i e ) θ/ (1−ρ) +1   ________________  ∑ k    δ k  A k / ( T  k e) θ/ (1−ρ) +1 < 1 + η σ ̃ , 
so that no country is completely specialized in innovation or production. The share 
of labor devoted to innovation in country  i is
(26)  r i =   L i 
e  _ L ̅i =  
1 __ σ ̃(1 −   A i / ( T i 
e ) θ/ (1−ρ) +1   ________________  ∑ k    δ k  A k / ( T k e) θ/ (1−ρ) +1 ) + η. 
PROOF:
See online Appendix.
The proposition states that countries with a relatively high ratio of productivity in 
innovation to production (i.e., countries that have a comparative advantage in inno-
vation) will (partially) specialize in innovation, as reflected in  r i > η .
A  Two-Country World: The Role of Home Market Effects.—Our model exhibits 
HMEs, according to which the location of innovation and production across coun-
tries is affected by country size, as well as trade and MP costs. To illustrate these 
effects we consider a world with two countries, homogenous workers (i.e.,  κ → ∞ ) 
and frictionless trade (i.e.,  τ ln = 1 for all  l, n ).
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a  two-country world, homogenous workers (i.e., 
κ → ∞ ) and frictionless trade. Assume further that  A 1 =  A 2 and  T 1 e =  T 2 e. If either (i)  L ̅1 >  L ̅2 and  γ 12 =  γ 21 = γ > 1 or (ii)  L ̅1 =  L ̅2 and  γ 12 <  γ 21 then in an inte-
rior equilibrium  r 1 >  r 2 .
PROOF:
See online Appendix.
The proposition shows the existence of a HME in innovation. Since MP costs are 
positive but trade is frictionless, it makes sense to innovate in the country with the 
larger labor force or with the higher inward MP costs.13
13 In a previous version of this paper we also studied the case in which MP is frictionless but trade is costly, 
showing the existence of an “ anti-HME” according to which the country that is larger or has a higher inward trade 
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E. Welfare Implications
We now turn to the model’s implications for how trade and MP affect welfare in 
each country. We are interested both in a country’s overall welfare, as measured by 
aggregate real income, as well as real wages of workers in innovation and production.
Gains from Openness.—We start by considering the overall gains from openness, 
defined as the change in aggregate real income as we move from a counterfactual 
equilibrium with no trade and no MP to the observed equilibrium. As shown in the 
online Appendix, the gains from openness as a function of equilibrium trade and MP 
flows (and the implied innovation share  r ) are
(27)  G O n =  [ (  X nnn  _ X n  ) 
− 1−ρ _θ   (  ∑ l   X nln  _____ X n  ) 
− ρ _θ ]  
Direct effect
   [ ( 1 − η _1 −  r n  ) 
 1 _κ( σ _ σ−1− 1 _θ)   (  r n  _η ) 
 κ−1 _κθ  ]    
Indirect effect
 . 
With no MP, this equation collapses to  G O n =  ( λ nn T ) −1/θ , as in Arkolakis, Costinot, 
and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). With MP, the gains from openness are composed of a 
direct and an indirect effect, which we discuss in turn.
To understand the direct effect, consider first the simple case with  ρ = 0 , under 
which the direct effect collapses to  ( X nnn / X n ) −1/θ . The term  X nnn / X n is an inverse 
measure of the degree of openness to trade and MP of country  n . As one would 
expect, this measure implies more openness than the typical measure of trade open-
ness, since  X nnn / X n <  λ nn T =  ∑ i   X inn / X n . Turning to the case with  ρ > 0 , note that
(28)  (  X nnn  _ X n  ) 
− 1−ρ _θ   (  ∑ l   X nln  _____ X n  ) 
− ρ _θ =  (  ∑ l 
  X nln  ______ ∑ i, l    X iln  ) 
− 1 _θ  (  X nnn  _____  ∑ l   X nln ) 
− 1−ρ _θ  . 
The first term on the  right-hand-side captures the gains for country  n from being 
able to consume goods produced with foreign technologies (independently of where 
production takes place), while the second term captures the gains for country  n from 
being able to use its own technologies abroad and import the goods back for domes-
tic consumption. Given the equilibrium flows  X iln ,  ρ > 0 leads to lower gains than ρ = 0 since correlated productivity draws imply that the gains associated with the 
second term are not as important.
The indirect effect captures the gains or losses triggered by the net flow of profits 
due to MP. Countries with net outward MP flows have a net inward flow of prof-
its and  r n > η —see (20), implying a positive indirect effect; the opposite occurs 
in countries with net inward MP flows. The indirect effect has two components. 
cost tends to specialize in production rather than innovation (see the online Appendix). We labeled this effect a 
 anti-HME because it runs counter to the logic of the HME, whereby the larger country specializes in the activity 
with increasing returns, which here is innovation. We have chosen not to highlight the  anti-HME here because it 
turns out to be much weaker than the HME. For example, our numerical simulations show that in the presence of 
both trade and MP costs, the large country tends to specialize in innovation. In particular, the large country special-
izes in innovation whenever  τ = γ > 1 and only specializes in production if  γ is much smaller than  τ . 
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The term  ( 1 − η ____1 −  r n  ) 
 1 _κ( σ ___ σ−1− 1 _θ)  captures how a net inflow of profits from MP implies 
a higher total income and a lower price index thanks to the effect of higher expen-
ditures on the variety of goods available for domestic consumption.14 The term 
 ( r n / η)  κ−1 _κθ  captures how a net inflow of profits is associated with higher entry (i.e., 
higher  M n ), which increases welfare by inducing a better selection of varieties in the 
domestic market.
It is useful to compare our result for gains from openness with those in the per-
fectly competitive setting of Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013), where the gains 
from openness are equal to the direct effect in ( 27 ).15 Thus, given trade and MP 
flows, the difference between the two models is captured entirely by the indirect 
effect. Our monopolistic competition setup then implies larger gains from openness 
than the perfect competition model of Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013) for 
countries with a net outflow of MP, while the opposite is true for countries with a 
net inflow of MP.
Gains from Trade and Gains from MP.—In addition to the gains from openness, 
we are also interested in the separate welfare effects of trade and MP. The gains from 
trade,  GT , are defined as the ratio of real income  ( X i / P i ) between the calibrated 
equilibrium and a counterfactual equilibrium where there is no trade, computed by 
letting  τ ln → ∞ for  l ≠ n . Analogously, the gains from MP,  GMP , are defined as the 
ratio of real income between the calibrated equilibrium and a counterfactual equi-
librium with no MP, computed by letting  γ il → ∞ for  i ≠ l . In the counterfactual 
analysis with the calibrated model in Section III we find that some countries (e.g., 
Turkey) lose from MP,  GMP < 1 , while some countries (e.g., Brazil and China) 
lose from trade,  GT < 1 . We now use simple cases of our model to shed light on 
these possibilities.
To understand how a country could lose from MP, it is useful to start by discussing 
a simpler result, namely that a country can lose from unilateral MP liberalization 
(i.e., a decline in inward MP costs). Consider a perfectly symmetric  two-country 
world with frictionless trade and homogeneous labor. As per Proposition 2, unilat-
eral MP liberalization leads to a decline in innovation, and (as shown in the online 
Appendix) this leads to a decline in welfare in the liberalizing country. This reso-
nates with the  well-known result of Venables (1987) that unilateral liberalization can 
14 Everything else equal, a higher income  X n implies lower productivity cutoffs for domestic sales and a lower 
price index  P n . More specifically, note that the elasticity of  G O n with respect to  ( 1 − η ____1 −  r n  ) in (27) can be written as 
 1 _κ[1 +  1 _θ( θ _____ σ − 1 − 1) ] . The  1 inside the square parenthesis comes from the direct effect of a higher income on 
 welfare, whereas the term  1 _θ( θ ____ σ − 1 − 1) captures selection effects according to which  P n falls with an increase in 
 X n / w n  F n with an elasticity  1 _θ( θ ____ σ − 1 − 1) , as can be seen from (A6) in the Appendix (for more on this “selection” 
elasticity, see Costinot and  Rodríguez-Clare 2014). The term  1 / κ outside the square parenthesis comes from the 
relationship between  1 −  r n and  X n / w n p  F n —see (O.12) in the online Appendix. 
15 Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013) did not derive this result explicitly, but it can be easily obtained from 
the equilibrium equations of their model in the special case with only tradable goods and no intermediate goods. 
The parameters  θ and  ρ in Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013) play analogous roles as in our model, except 
that in their case those parameters are associated with a multivariate Fréchet distribution rather than a multivariate 
Pareto distribution. 
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decrease welfare in a Krugman (1980) model with a  homogeneous-good sector, but 
the mechanisms are different. The welfare effect in Venables (1987) is caused by the 
 de-location of firms away from the liberalizing country and the resulting increase of 
its  differentiated-goods price index. In contrast, in our model the price index falls 
in the liberalizing country, but its welfare declines because of a deterioration in its 
terms of trade caused by the expansion of employment in the production sector.
Can a country lose from multilateral MP liberalization? Resorting to numerical 
examples in the simple case of two countries we find that this is indeed possible.16 
The logic is the same as the one outlined above: if MP liberalization triggers home 
market effects that push innovation in country  i below its  no-MP level, i.e.,  r i <  η , 
the deterioration of country  i’s terms of trade may dominate the direct MP gains 
from the use of foreign ideas, implying losses from MP,  GMP < 1 .
To understand how a country could lose from trade, we turn again to the simple 
 two-country numerical example discussed above, and study the consequences of 
multilateral trade liberalization in a setting where everything is symmetric except 
for MP costs. Assume that inward MP costs are lower than outward MP costs for 
country  2 ( γ 12 <  γ 21 ), so that (from Proposition 2) country  1 specializes in inno-
vation and country  2 specializes in production ( r 1 > η >  r 2 ). Compared to trade 
autarky, the equilibrium with finite and symmetric trade costs entails a lower real 
wage in country  2 . Interestingly, the relative wage of country  2 increases as we 
open up trade, but prices increase even more. Reminiscent of Venables (1987), the 
 de-location of innovation from country  2 to country  1 leads to an increase in the 
price index in country  2 as it must now incur in MP costs for more of the ideas used 
domestically.
The previous discussion may suggest the possibility that country i loses from 
openness,  GO < 1 . While we cannot rule out this possibility for all parameter 
 values, we prove in the online Appendix that for the important case of  κ → ∞ the 
gains from openness in the  multi-country setting must be positive for all countries. 
Moreover, for other parameter values, our numerical simulations for two countries 
never lead to such a result: even if openness leads to a decline in innovation below 
its autarky value, i.e.,  r i < η , the direct gains from openness always outweigh the 
indirect losses through a decline in innovation. The key insight is that trade and MP 
are substitutes in the sense that, if one of these channels is present, adding the other 
channel leads to small additional direct gains (see Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare 
2013) which may not be enough to compensate for the losses arising from the fall 
in innovation.
Multinational Production and Real Wages in Production and Innovation.—As 
mentioned in the Introduction, there is popular concern that globalization of produc-
tion may have a detrimental effect on production workers in rich countries. We use 
our model to explore this possibility by looking at the effect of MP on the real wage 
of production workers in a country that has a comparative advantage in innovation. 
To make the analysis tractable, we focus on the comparative statics of moving from 
a situation with frictionless trade but no MP to a situation with both frictionless trade 
16 For the numerical example we set  θ, σ , and  ρ  as calibrated in Section IIB, together with  κ → ∞ ,  τ 12 =  τ 21 = 3 , 
and  γ 12 = 3 and  γ 21 = 4 . 
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and frictionless MP. The proposition below establishes that there are indeed conditions 
under which production workers would be hurt by such a move.
The proposition considers a special case in which productivity in production is the 
same across countries,  A i ≡  ( T i p ) 1/ (1−ρ)  / L ̅i = A for all  i , so a “rich” country here 
is one with a relatively high  T i e and hence a comparative advantage in innovation. 
We also assume that  ρ → 1 , so that the gains from MP arising from differences in 
firm productivity across countries are not present in this case, making it more likely 
that MP will hurt production workers. Finally, and most importantly, we assume that 
κ → 1 , so that production workers are stuck in production.
PROPOSITION 3: Consider a world with no worker mobility across sectors 
(i.e.,  κ → 1 ), and  ρ → 1 . Consider a switch from frictionless trade but no MP to 
 frictionless trade and MP. (i) Suppose that  A i = A for all  i ,  T j e =  T e for all  j ≠ i , 
and  T i e =  T e + ε , for  ε small enough. In country  i , the switch increases the real 
wage for innovation workers and aggregate real income, but it increases real pro-
duction wages if and only if  σ <  θ ̅≡   (1 + θ) 2  ______
1 + θ +  θ 2  . (ii) Suppose that  A i = 0 <  A j for 
all  i ≠  j and  T i e =  T e for all  i . The switch increases aggregate real income, but it 
decreases the real wage for innovation workers in country  j .
PROOF:
See online Appendix.
Consider the first part of the proposition. By giving firms the ability to locate pro-
duction in  low-production wage countries, MP exerts downward pressure on produc-
tion wages in rich countries. The same forces lead to an increase in innovation wages 
and total income, and this increases the variety of goods available for consumption 
and decreases the price index. If the elasticity of substitution is low enough, this 
increase in variety will have a large downward effect on the price index, which more 
than compensates for the decrease in nominal wages, allowing real production wages 
to increase.
Now consider the second part of the proposition. MP liberalization that leads the 
innovation labor from a country to lose its monopoly power over an abundant supply 
of production workers can have dramatic implications for innovation labor’s real 
wage. Intuitively, innovation labor is not differentiated by country and thus moving 
from no MP to free MP causes innovation worker’s wages to equalize across coun-
tries while having less dramatic effects on the cost of less substitutable production 
worker labor. The fall in the relative wage of innovation workers relative to produc-
tion workers in the production-worker-abundant country must swamp the efficiency 
gains associated with production reallocation is guaranteed by the parameter restric-
tion because of the required parameter restriction that  θ > σ − 1 .
As we will see below, even with the low value of  κ = 2 , our calibrated model 
implies that production workers actually gain from MP liberalization in countries 
that further specialize in innovation. Instead, the losers are the innovation work-
ers in some of the countries that deepen their specialization in production as a 
consequence of MP liberalization. Not surprisingly, low worker mobility is a key 
assumption for the result above. As we show in the online Appendix, with perfect 
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worker mobility (i.e.,  κ → ∞ ), and assuming that condition ( 25 ) holds so that the 
equilibrium in a frictionless world is an interior equilibrium, then a move from 
frictionless trade but no MP to frictionless trade and frictionless MP increases the 
common real wage paid to workers employed in the innovation and production 
sectors.
II. Model’s Calibration
The model’s calibration proceeds in two parts. In the first part we estimate two 
different specifications of the gravity equation to obtain trade elasticities that are 
used as targets to calibrate  θ and  ρ . In the second part we estimate trade and MP 
costs, as well as the parameters related to productivity in production and innovation, 
T i P and  T i e . For trade and MP costs, for which we assume are symmetric, we target 
the bilateral trade and MP shares in the data and implement a generalized version of 
the Head and Ries (2001) procedure. For the productivity parameters, we calibrate 
T i e by targeting a  model-based measure of innovation and  T i p by targeting a measure 
of gross production in manufacturing, for each country.
A. Gravity Estimates
We use data on production, trade, and multinational sales to estimate two different 
gravity equations; the estimated trade elasticities will serve as targets for calibration. 
The first gravity equation is defined over  X iln , the aggregate sales of firms that orig-
inate in country  i , produce in country  l , and sell in country  n . Because this gravity 
equation is defined over trade flows conducted by firms that originate from a single 
origin, we refer to this equation as “restricted gravity.” The second gravity equation 
is defined over  X ln ≡  ∑ i   X iln , the sales to  n from all firms operating in country  l (as 
in the standard analysis). Because this gravity equation is defined over trade flows 
by firms from all countries, we refer to this equation as “unrestricted gravity.”
Details about the construction of the data and sources are in Appendix B.
Restricted Gravity.—To estimate the restricted gravity equation, we use expres-
sion (7) and take logarithms to obtain
(29)  ln  X iln =  α il r +  μ in r −  θ _ 1 − ρ ln  τ ln , 
where  α il r and  μ in r are fixed effects.17 We rely on a measure of trade costs that is 
directly related to a critical component of  τ ln : the different tariffs applied to goods 
across production locations. Specifically, we parameterize trade costs so that
(30)  ln  X iln =  α il r +  μ in r +  β r ln (1 +  t ln )  +  ∑ 
k
  δ k r [1|  d ln ∈  d k ] +  Θ r  H ln +  ε iln ,  
17 Given  i , the fixed effect captured by  α il r varies by location of production and corresponds (in the model) to 
α il r = ln ( M i  [ T i e  T l p  (  w l p  γ il ) −θ ]  
1 ___ 1−ρ ) , while the fixed effect captured by  μ in r varies by country of destination and cor-
responds (in the model) to  μ in r = ln ( X n  Ψ in  
−ρ _
1−ρ  /  ∑ k    M k  Ψ kn ) . 
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where  t ln is the simple average tariff applied by  n on goods from  l ,  [1 |   d ln ∈  d k ] is 
an indicator variable for distance between  n and  l (whose marginal effect on trade 
costs is given by  δ k r) and  H ln is a vector of standard gravity controls, including dum-
mies for shared language and border, and an indicator variable that is equal to one if 
l = n to control for the variation in  τ ln that is due to unmeasured trade costs, such as 
administrative and information frictions, that local production avoids. The estimated 
coefficient  β ˆ r has the structural interpretation of the parameter ratio  θ / (1 − ρ) under 
the assumption that our measure of  t ln captures some of the variation in trade costs 
between countries.
The data for  X iln with  l ≠ US = i was constructed from the 1999 Benchmark 
Survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on the operations of US mul-
tinationals abroad. Specifically, for each country  l ≠ US we observe sales of US 
multinationals in their host country and their exports to the United States, Canada, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and a composite of 14 European Union countries. The 
data for  X iln with  l = US = i was constructed using a mixture of publicly available 
data and a confidential survey conducted by the BEA on the activities of the US 
affiliates of foreign firms.
In our sample on the global operations of US multinationals, there are two forms 
of variation in  t ln that identify  β r . The first type of variation is due to the fact that 
firms that open a local affiliate avoid all trade costs (i.e.,  t nn = 0 ), while firms from 
another country, generally, must pay the applied MFN tariff rate. A second source of 
variation in  t ln is due to the fact that some  l and  n belong to common preferential trade 
agreements (so that  t ln = 0 ), while others do not (so that exports from  l pay coun-
try  n ’s MFN tariff rates).18 Because in our data there are multiple observations for 
each production location  l and for each destination country  n , we can estimate (30) 
via ordinary least squares (OLS), as well as Poisson  pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
estimation (PPML).
Unrestricted Gravity.—The “unrestricted” gravity equation has the same form as 
the “restricted” gravity equation, but it is estimated on the bilateral sales of all firms 
located in country  l selling to country  n . Specifically, we estimate
(31)  ln  X ln =  α l u +  μ n u +  β u ln (1 +  t ln )  +  ∑ 
k
  δ k u [1|  d ln ∈  d k ] +  Θ u  H ln +  v iln . 
We estimate (31) by OLS and PPML using data for manufacturing on trade vol-
umes from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002), and total expenditure from various 
sources, for 1999. To ensure comparability between the coefficients, we restrict the 
sample so that the country pair coverage in the restricted and unrestricted samples 
is the same.
The coefficient estimate  β ˆ  u does not have a structural interpretation, but it still 
provides information on the relative magnitudes of  θ and  ρ . When MP is not pos-
sible, all exports are done by local firms so that the correlation of the firm produc-
tivity shocks determined by  ρ is irrelevant, and the coefficient on tariffs is equal 
18 There is also some variation in constructed tariff measures due to the fact that developed countries extend 
generalized system of preference tariffs to a number of developing countries. 
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to  θ , as can be seen in (24). In the data most exports are done by domestic firms 
so that  X ln disproportionately contains information on the operations of domestic 
firms. This fact suggests that  β ˆ  u is closer to  θ than  β ˆ  r , which in turn is equal to 
 θ / (1 − ρ) . In summary, the model implies the following restriction on parameters: 
 β ˆ  r = − θ / (1 − ρ) <  β ˆ  u < − θ < 0 .
Results.—The coefficient estimates  β ˆ  r and  β ˆ  u are reported in the first and second 
rows of Table 1, respectively. The estimates for the other coefficients all have the 
expected signs and are reported in the online Appendix. The first two columns report 
the results using OLS and differ only in the way that bilateral tariffs  t ln are com-
puted. The raw data is for tariffs at the industry level, and we need to aggregate up 
to a single tariff without using endogenous  country-level trade shares as weights. In 
the first column the tariff is computed as a simple average of the applied tariff across 
industries, while in the second column we use common weights given by the value 
of global trade in the industry divided by the value of total global trade.19 Finally, 
the third and fourth columns report results using PPML. Using PPML avoids pos-
sible bias in OLS estimates because of heteroscedasticity, as explained by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and also allows us to use the dependent variable in lev-
els, and hence, to include zero flows.
Consistent with the model, the four specifications yield a more negative trade elas-
ticity for the restricted regression relative to the unrestricted regression. A Wald test 
of the cross equation restriction that the trade elasticity is the same for the restricted 
and unrestricted gravity equations reveals that the difference is statistically signifi-
cant at standard levels for both of the OLS regressions but not for the PPML regres-
sions. Based on the results in Table 1, we set targets of  β ˆ  r = 10 and  β ˆ  u = 5 in the 
calibration below. This estimate for the unrestricted trade elasticity is in the range of 
estimates obtained by the trade literature (such as Romalis 2007; Simonovska and 
Waugh 2014; and Caliendo and Parro 2015). Additionally, Head and Mayer (2014) 
survey estimates of trade elasticities and concluded that their “preferred estimate is 
−5.03, the median coefficient obtained using tariff variation, …”
Robustness Using Instrumental Variables.—One concern that arises when tariffs 
are used to estimate trade elasticities is that tariffs are endogenous. The exporter and 
importer fixed effects included in our baseline gravity equations ease this concern 
with respect to the absolute tariff level, but the concern remains that the propensity 
for firms to export from country  l to country  n is correlated with the likelihood that 
l and  n enter into a free trade agreement. Some trade agreements (e.g.,  US-Israel, 
 US-Colombia) are driven by political rather than commercial concerns, while others 
(e.g.,  US-Canada) are driven by the volumes of trade between the involved countries 
that are in turn driven by geography. The gravity controls in (30) proxy for this affin-
ity. If, however, other determinants of preferential trade agreements are excluded 
from (30), the trade elasticity may be biased. Given the importance of these trade 
19 The tariff data is from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data provided by the World Bank and 
calculated at the H.S.  six-digit level for the year closest to 1999 for which data were available. 
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elasticities for our calibration, we consider an alternative  instrumental-variable 
estimation.
Following Brainard (1997) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), we measure 
trade barriers as the product of tariffs and freight and insurance costs, and con-
sider as our dependent variable the  Head-Ries measure of unrestricted and restricted 
bilateral trade and MP flows between the United States and those of its trade part-
ners for which we have the necessary  freight-cost data.20 To address the endoge-
neity concern, we instrument trade costs with the logarithm of distance, dummies 
for a border with the United States and for English as a main language, and an 
index of infrastructure quality. A bivariate OLS regression produces trade elastic-
ities of −11.8 and −6.9 for the restricted and unrestricted gravity equations. In 
the  instrumental-variable regression, we obtain trade elasticities that are moderately 
higher at −14.4 and −9.7, respectively. These estimates are not statistically different 
in magnitude from those obtain in our baseline specifications.
B. Calibration Procedure
We restrict our analysis to 26 countries for which we have good data for both 
trade, output, and MP.
For trade we use the World  Input-Output Database (WIOD) on manufacturing 
trade flows from any country  l to country  n, including home sales, as the empirical 
counterpart of bilateral trade in the model.21 Using this information, we construct 
the  N × N matrix of trade shares,  λ ln T , and the  N × 1 vector of aggregate (manufac-
turing) expenditures,  X n .
We use data from Ramondo et al. (2015) on the gross value of production for mul-
tinational affiliates from country  i in country  l to construct the empirical counterpart 
of bilateral MP flows and obtain an  N × N matrix of production shares,  λ il M . Since 
our quantitative analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector, while our MP data 
includes all MP flows, we rely on the following approximation. We observe that, for 
the United States, MP flows in manufacturing account for approximately one half 
20 We choose to use these indices, rather than the trade flows (in logs) directly, because the data on bilateral 
freight costs are available only for the United States, impeding the inclusion of two sets of country fixed effects in 
the gravity equations. 
21 See Timmer (2012) and Costinot and  Rodríguez-Clare (2014) for the description of the WIOD database. 
Table 1—Restricted and Unrestricted Gravity
OLS PPML
Tariffs: Unweighted average Weighted average Unweighted average Weighted average
Restricted −10.9 −11.1 −8.4 −11.6
(3.5) (3.5) (2.6) (4.0)
Unrestricted −4.3 −5.3 −5.4 −8.6
(1.8) (1.9) (1.7) (2.6)
Notes: Unweighted average refers to a simple average across industry tariffs; weighted average refers to an average 
across industry tariffs using as weights the share of the industry in total trade. The number of observations is 317 in 
the OLS specification and 384 in the PPML specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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of overall MP flows, while manufacturing gross output is approximately one half of 
overall GDP (according to our own calculations using BEA data, an average over 
 1996–2001). Thus, we take overall MP flows divided by GDP as an approximation 
of manufacturing MP flows as a share of gross production in manufacturing.22
We measure the  N × 1 vector of labor endowments,  L ̅i , as equipped labor, from 
Klenow and  Rodríguez-Clare (2005), multiplied by the share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector, from UNIDO. This is also the variable we refer to as country 
size. All the data refer to an average over  1996–2001.
Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters and each of the targeted moments 
in the data. We set  θ / (1 − ρ) = 10 to match the restricted gravity elasticities shown 
in Table 1. To disentangle  ρ from  θ , we use the predictions of the model regard-
ing the unrestricted gravity regression coefficient. As described below, this leads to 
θ = 4.5 and  ρ = 0.55 . We set  σ = 4 , a common value in the literature that implies 
a markup of  33 percent, which is on the high end of the range of estimates for mark-
ups in manufacturing across the OECD (see Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat 1996; and 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). The calibrated values for  θ and  σ imply 
that  η = 16.7 , which under no MP is also the innovation share. As discussed further 
below, this is not far above an estimate of the returns to intangible capital as a share 
of GDP in the United States.
We also need a value for  κ , which determines the elasticity of labor supply to 
innovation versus production with respect to the relative wage  w e / w p . We have 
some guidance from recent quantitative work for the value of this parameter in 
related contexts. In a model where  κ determines the wage elasticity of labor supply 
for workers across occupations, Hsieh et al. (2013) estimate a value of 2, while 
Burstein, Morales, and Vogel (2016) estimate a lower value of 1.8. Using data from 
the United States and a model where  κ determines the wage elasticity of labor sup-
ply across manufacturing  sub-sectors, Galle, Rodríguez-Clare, and Yi (2015) also 
find a value of 2. We thus set  κ = 2 in our baseline calibration, and experiment with 
an alternative high value of 5 in Section IVA.
The calibration of the rest of the parameters proceeds in three steps. The first step 
computes the matrices of  τ ’s and  γ ’s by using the trade and MP shares from the data. 
Our procedure is an extension of the approach in Head and Ries (2001) to a setting 
with MP. Head and Ries (2001) show that in a gravity model of trade, if one assumes 
that trade costs are symmetric,  τ nl =  τ ln , and there are no domestic trade costs (i.e., 
τ nn = 1 for all  n ) then trade costs can be obtained as  τ ˆ  ln hr =  [( λ ln T  λ nl T )/( λ ll T  λ nn T )] −1/2θ . 
For  ρ = 0 the  Head-Ries method can be used in our model to estimate trade and MP 
costs, but for  ρ > 0 this is no longer the case. However, as we show in Appendix C, 
given data on bilateral trade and MP flows, our model determines all trilateral flows, 
X iln . Imposing symmetry on trade and MP costs as well as  τ ll =  γ ll = 1 for all  l , and 
22 Is this a plausible approximation for the remaining countries in our sample? We can check it for a  sub-sample 
of 14 countries in our sample using data assembled by Alviarez (2015) containing the share of manufacturing 
(inward) MP for the period  2003–2011, and data for gross output in manufacturing as a share of GDP for the years 
1995, 2000, and 2005 from the OECD  Inter-Country  Input-Output Tables. The average ratio of these two shares 
is 0.94, with a standard deviation of 0.16. We thank Vanessa Alviarez for kindly sharing her calculations with us. 
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given values for  ρ and  θ , we can then use these trilateral flows to construct estimates 
of  τ ln and  γ il .23
The second step of the calibration procedure involves calibrating the productivity 
parameters  T  l p and  T  i e . We normalize  T i e =  T i p = 1 for  i = USA and then pick  T i e 
and  T i p so that the  model-implied values for innovation shares  r i and observed gross 
manufacturing output levels  Y i (both relative to the United States) exactly match the 
corresponding values computed using (20) and our data on trade, MP, and aggregate 
expenditures (all for manufacturing). Table 3 shows the calibrated values for  T i p and 
T i e .24
The third and final step of the algorithm requires estimating an unrestricted grav-
ity regression in which the dependent variable is the  model-generated trade share 
from  l to  n and the regressors are the calibrated trade costs from  l to  n , as well as 
exporter and importer fixed effects. For  θ = 4.5 and  ρ = 0.55 , which satisfy our 
target of  θ / (1 − ρ) = 10 , this regression yields an unrestricted trade elasticity of 
5 . 7 (s.e. 0.15), just slightly above the targeted 5 in the data.
23 One source of asymmetry in trade costs that we are ignoring here, and that we used for the estimation of 
trade elasticities in Section IIA, is tariffs. We can extend our generalized  Head-Ries procedure to allow for tariffs 
and calculate the symmetric part of trade costs as a residual. The results are virtually unchanged relative to those 
in our baseline, a result that is not surprising given the very low bilateral tariffs prevailing between the countries 
in our sample. 
24 The identification strategy we use is in some aspects related to the one in Burstein and  Monge-Naranjo 
(2009). Our distinction between  T  i p and  T  i e is related to their notion of  country-embedded productivity that affects 
any firm producing in country  l , and  firm-embedded productivity that affects all firms from country  i , respectively. 
One difference stems from the fact that, whereas in Burstein and  Monge-Naranjo (2009) there are only  one-way 
MP flows, in our case we have  two-way MP flows. Thus, instead of using something like  ∑ i∈R    λ il M , with  R being the 
set of rich countries, we use net MP flows as one of the key moments for calibrating  T  e and  T p . Additionally, while 
Burstein and  Monge-Naranjo (2009) use data on taxation of foreign profits to disentangle MP costs from  T  i e , we 
impose symmetry and compute  γ s using the generalized  Head-Ries procedure. 
Table 2—Calibrated Model Parameters and Data Targets
Parameters Moments
Notation Value Description Description
 σ 4 Elasticity of substitution Mark-up (OECD)
 κ 2 Fréchet shape parameter Literature
 θ/(1 − ρ) 10 Restricted trade elasticity Restricted gravity equation
 θ 4.5 MVP shape parameter Unrestricted gravity equation (US)
 ρ 0.55 MVP correlation parameter Implied from restr. gravity and  θ 
 η 0.167 Profit share Implied from  θ and  σ 
 T i P 0.38 (0.44) Average productivity in production in  i Gross manufacturing production in  i 
 T i e 1.77 (1.13) Average productivity in innovation in  i Innovation rate in  i 
 τ ˆln hr 2.9 (0.8) Trade cost from  l to  n Trade share from  l to  n 
 γ ˆ il hr 4.4 (3.5) MP cost from  i to  l MP share from  i to  l 
Notes: Trade elasticity refers to the elasticity of exports of firms from  i located in  l and selling to  n to trade costs 
from  l to  n . Parameter values for  T i P and  T i e refer to averages across  N countries, relative to values for the United 
States. Parameter values for  τ ln and  γ il refer to averages across the  N × (N − 1) country pairs. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses.
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C. Calibration Results
Fit of Calibrated Model.—We next assess the fit of the calibrated model. Figure 5 
plots inward and outward trade and MP flows, respectively, at the country level. 
Trade flows are normalized by absorption in manufacturing in country  n , both in the 
model and the data, while MP flows are normalized by gross output in the model and 
GDP in country  n in the data. Note that aggregate shares were not directly targeted 
by our calibration procedure. The figure reveals that the model delivers slightly 
higher MP outward shares and export shares than the ones observed in the data.25
Figure 6 plots bilateral trade and MP shares, model versus data. These variables 
in the data are an input into the model’s calibration, but given the symmetry assump-
tion on trade and MP costs, it is not the case that the model exactly matches all the 
elements of the bilateral flow matrices. In other words, ours is an “ over-identified” 
procedure, with more targeted moments ( 2 × N × (N − 1) ) than parameters 
( 2 × N × (N − 1)/ 2 ) to estimate. The figure reveals that the calibrated model 
25 On average, outward MP shares are 0.23 in the model, and 0.19 in the data, while inward shares are, respec-
tively, 0.35 and 0.30. For export and import shares, the model delivers averages of 0.26 and 0.26, respectively, while 
the data delivers average of around 0.32 and 0.33, respectively. 
Table 3—Comparative Advantage versus Home-Market Effects
  T i P   T i e 
Innovation share,  r i 
Baseline   T i e =  A i = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia (AUS) 0.175 0.695 0.067 0.086
Austria (AUT) 0.226 2.626 0.147 0.073
Benelux (BNX) 0.600 1.549 0.203 0.183
Brazil (BRA) 0.206 0.745 0.145 0.154
Canada (CAN) 0.403 1.371 0.129 0.097
China (CHN) 0.003 0.140 0.139 0.167
Cyprus (CYP) 0.036 3.826 0.167 0.167
Denmark (DNK) 0.162 3.573 0.193 0.097
Spain (ESP) 0.568 1.660 0.137 0.125
Finland (FIN) 0.247 4.136 0.195 0.084
France (FRA) 0.589 1.740 0.175 0.138
United Kingdom (GBR) 0.523 1.465 0.159 0.131
Germany (GER) 0.480 1.132 0.174 0.184
Greece (GRC) 0.178 3.832 0.160 0.131
Hungary (HUN) 0.051 1.247 0.059 0.050
Ireland (IRL) 0.240 2.104 0.078 0.033
Italy (ITA) 1.176 2.007 0.151 0.130
Japan (JPN) 1.963 1.931 0.178 0.159
Korea (KOR) 0.242 1.689 0.162 0.144
Mexico (MEX) 0.006 0.460 0.133 0.147
Poland (POL) 0.001 0.371 0.121 0.151
Portugal (PRT) 0.142 1.565 0.097 0.086
Romania (ROM) 0.0001 0.301 0.159 0.165
Sweden (SWE) 0.332 2.708 0.162 0.091
Turkey (TUR) 0.091 1.163 0.159 0.159
United States (USA) 1.000 1.000 0.182 0.202
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 shows the values for  T  p and  T  e , respectively, from the baseline calibration. Columns 3 and 
4 show innovation shares,  r i , coming from the model’s equilibria with  T  i e and  T  i p set to their baseline values, and 
T i  e =  A i = 1 , with  A i ≡  ( T i  p ) 1/(1−ρ) / L ̅i , respectively. Equilibria calculated without trade and MP imbalances, Δ = 0 .
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 overall does a good job in matching the bilateral data: the model captures more than 
90 percent of the variation observed in the data in bilateral trade and MP shares, 
respectively. Overall, the average bilateral MP share in the data is 0.012 against 
0.014 in the model, while the average for bilateral trade share in the data is 0.013 
against 0.010 in the model.26
Innovation, Comparative Advantage and HMEs.—We next discuss the role of 
comparative advantage and HMEs in explaining the  cross-country variation in 
innovation shares. Our assumption that trade and MP costs are symmetric becomes 
critical here; without such an assumption, we could not identify  T  i e relative to 
A i ≡  ( T  i p ) 1/ (1−ρ)  / L ̅i .
The difference between  r i in column 3 in Table 3 and  η = 0.167 tells us the spe-
cialization pattern for each country according to our baseline calibration. Countries 
with  r i > η are specialized in innovation (such as the United States, Denmark, and 
Benelux), and countries with  r i < η are specialized in production (such as China, 
Ireland, and Mexico).
26 We should note that we do not evaluate the quantitative predictions of our model with respect to income dis-
tribution across and within countries as the necessary data are not available for the large number of countries in our 
dataset. A methodology for computing  model-consistent measures of wages by occupation can be found in Burstein 
et al. (2016), who document a rise in the relative wages of occupations that are likely associated with innovation 
and firm entry. 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
AUS
AUT
BNX
BRA
CAN
CHNYP
DNK
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBRGER
GRCHUN
IRL
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEXPOL
PRT
R M
SWE
TUR
USA
Panel A. Outward MP
Data
M
od
el
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
AUSAUT
BNX
BRA
CAN
CHN
CYP
DNKESPFIN
FRA
GBR
GER
GRC
HUNIRL
ITA
JPNKOR
MEX
POL
PRT
ROM
SWE
TUR
USA
Panel B. Inward MP
Data
M
od
el
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
AUS
AUT
BNX
BRA
CAN
CHN
CYP DNK
ESP
FIN
FRAGBRGERGRC HUN
IRL
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
POLPRT
ROM
SWE
TUR
USA
Panel C. Exports
Data
M
od
el
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
AUS
AUTBNX
BRA
CAN
CHN
CYP
DNK
ESPFIN
FRAGBR
GER
GRC
HUN IRL
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
POLPRT
ROM
SWE
TUR
USA
Panel D. Imports
Data
M
od
el
Figure 5. Aggregate Trade and MP Shares: Model versus Data
Notes: Imports and exports for country  n are normalized by manufacturing absorption in country  n . Outward 
(inward) MP shares refer to total sales of foreign affiliates from (into) country  n normalized by gross production in 
country  n in the model (GDP in country  n in the data).
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To isolate the role of HME,  vis-à-vis the role of comparative advantage, we use 
the calibrated model and shut down comparative advantage by setting  T i e = 1 and 
T i p =  L ̅ i 1−ρ for all  i . Column 4 in Table 3 shows the resulting innovation share,  r i , 
and compares it with the one from our baseline calibration in column 3, in both 
cases shutting down trade and MP deficits by setting  Δ i = 0 for all  i . The difference 
between  r i in column 4 and  η isolates the effects of HMEs on innovation in country 
i , with the difference between  r i in columns 3 and 4 revealing the effects of compar-
ative advantage.
In general, HMEs push small countries such as Hungary and Ireland towards spe-
cialization in production, while they push large countries such as the United States 
to specialize in innovation. But the neighborhood also matters and HMEs still lead 
to specialization in innovation in some small countries (e.g., Benelux). Of course, 
small countries with adverse HMEs may nevertheless be specialized in innovation 
thanks to comparative advantage (i.e., a relatively high  T i e / A i ). We can see that this 
is the case for Denmark and Finland by comparing columns 3 and 4. On the con-
trary, and quite surprisingly, the United States is revealed to have a comparative 
advantage in production. If it had a comparative advantage in innovation  r should be 
higher in column 3 than in 4.
It is important to note that our symmetry assumption on trade and MP costs 
is only necessary to disentangle the role of comparative advantage and HMEs in 
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Figure 6. Bilateral Trade and MP Shares: Model versus Data
Notes: Imports and exports from country  l to  n are normalized by manufacturing absorption in country  n . MP flows 
from  i to  l are normalized by gross production in country  n in the model (GDP in country  n in the data).
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driving countries to specialize in innovation or production—this assumption is not 
 necessary for counterfactual analysis. In fact, in a previous version of this paper (see 
Arkolakis et al. 2013) we developed a version of the “ just-identified” calibration 
procedure as in Dekle et al. (2008) that does not rely on the symmetry assumption. 
This alternative calibration procedure does not identify the productivity parameters 
T  e and  T p , but its counterfactual implications are similar to those we get from our 
 symmetry-based calibration.27
D. Additional Implications
Innovation Shares: Figure 7 shows the innovation share in the model and in 
the data relative to the United States. The innovation share in the model is  r i from 
Table 3, while in the data this share corresponds to employment in R&D as a share 
of total employment, from UNIDO, as an average over the nineties.
There is a strong positive association between the two variables in spite of the fact 
that R&D data was not used in the calibration of the model (correlation coefficient 
of 0.67). On the one hand, this positive association suggests that the model does 
a good job in capturing the observed relationship between trade, MP, and innova-
tion. On the other hand, the innovation shares in the data and the model are quite 
different in levels—the observed share of labor employed in R&D is an order of 
magnitude lower than the model’s implied share, which revolves around 17 per-
cent. One reason for this discrepancy is that R&D in the data captures only a small 
part of what constitutes innovation in the model. The innovation share implied by 
the model is of the same order of magnitude to the 15 percent share of income 
accrued to intangible capital—which includes not only R&D expenditures, but also 
 marketing  expenditures—in the United States (average for  2000–2003), as calcu-
lated by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009).28
27 For instance, the correlation between the gains from openness obtained under each procedure is 0.92, with 
gains of 24.6 and 25.8 percent, respectively, for the average country in the over- and  just-identified procedure. 
Additionally, for the counterfactual exercise in Table 7 for which we fully liberalize MP from the United States 
to China, the  just-identified calibration implies that US production workers would gain one percent, rather than 
2 percent as in our current calibration, and US innovation workers would gain 12 percent, rather than 16 percent. 
28 Corrado et al. (2014) extend their analysis of the income share of intangible capital to other OECD countries 
besides the United States. For a subset of 18 countries that are in both our sample and in theirs, the correlation 
between our innovation share and their computed income share of intangible capital is 0.46. 
Table 4—Trade Costs, MP Costs, and Gravity: Baseline Calibration
Distance dummies Other gravity controls
D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 Border Language R2
Bilateral trade costs 0.966 0.954 1.112 1.159 1.149 0.035 −0.091 0.61
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Bilateral MP costs 0.702 0.882 1.049 1.091 1.235 −0.065 −0.154 0.93
(0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Notes: Coefficients are estimated through OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Trade and MP Costs: The estimated trade and MP costs should correlate to geo-
graphic variables such as bilateral distance. To evaluate this relationship we regress 
the logarithm of estimated trade and MP costs on an indicator variable for distance 
bins, as in the gravity regressions above, border and language dummies, and origin 
and destination fixed effects (see Table 4). Except for the estimates of the border 
dummy on trade costs, the coefficients are all significant at the 1 percent level and 
have the expected signs: trade and MP costs increase with distance and are lower for 
country pairs that share a language.
Bridge MP: As discussed above, our calibration procedure implies a unique map-
ping from observed bilateral trade and MP shares to simulated trilateral flows,  X iln . 
We now assess the ability of our model to predict these trilateral flows for the United 
States ( i = USA ), which is the only case for which we have the necessary data. 
Notice that this data was not used in the calibration of trade and MP costs, except of 
course as part of the aggregate bilateral trade flows.
Following Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013), we refer to MP sales sold out-
side of the local market as bridge MP (BMP) flows, since firms from  i use  l as a 
bridge to reach another location  n . In turn, BMP shares are defined as the ratio of 
BMP to total MP flows from  i in  l ( ∑ n≠l    X iln / ∑ n    X iln ). The BMP shares predicted 
by the model are lower than the ones in the data. Across all production locations for 
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Figure 7. Innovation Shares: Model versus Data
Notes: Innovation shares refer to R&D employment shares: in the model, the (equilibrium) variable  r , calculated 
with exogenous current account imbalances,  Δ ≠ 0 (the variable in column 3 of Table 3); in the data, manufactur-
ing R&D employment as a share of total manufacturing employment, closest year available to 1999, from OECD 
(data on total manufacturing employment for China are from Lardy 2015). Brazil, Mexico, and Cyprus do not have 
data. Shares are relative to the United States.
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US multinationals, the average BMP share in the model is  0.054 , while this is  0.36 
in the data.29 Predicted BMP flows are low because in the calibrated model multi-
nationals tend to serve foreign markets mostly through exports or MP rather than 
BMP. This is a consequence of the relatively high value of  ρ in our calibration (i.e., 
ρ = 0.55 ), which is dictated by the large gap between the estimated trade elasticities 
in the restricted and unrestricted gravity equations. Results are very different if we 
simply imposed  ρ = 0 , as we explain in detail in Section IVA.
Digging deeper into the variation in BMP, we find that the correlation between 
predicted BMP by country and destination for US firms (i.e.,  X iln for  i = US ) is 
nearly one when compared with the actual data. A large part of this is due to gravity: 
sales from large countries to large countries tend to be large. To control for gravity 
we compare  log ( X iln / Y l  X l ) as predicted by the model and as observed in the data. 
For  ρ = 0.55 , the correlation is roughly 0.45, whereas for  ρ = 0 the correlation 
falls to roughly 0.40. The better fit of the data to the micro patterns of BMP is to be 
expected as the trade elasticities in the aggregate data imply a  ρ that is greater than 
zero.
III. Counterfactual Experiments
Armed with our calibrated model, we perform a series of counterfactual exper-
iments to understand the effects of openness on innovation and welfare across and 
within countries. All our counterfactuals are performed assuming that the aggregate 
trade and MP deficits are zero (i.e., by setting  Δ i = 0 ).
We first calculate the gains from openness as well as the gains from trade and 
the gains from MP, according to the definitions in Section IE. We then compute the 
effect of a decline in MP costs on innovation, real income, and real wages of work-
ers in the innovation and production sectors. Next, motivated by its recent emer-
gence as a key location for manufacturing production, we analyze the effects of the 
integration of China to the world economy through various exercises. We finish with 
a couple of exercises designed to explore the likely implications of Brexit and a tax 
on US firms that set up production locations abroad.
Before presenting our results, we acknowledge that the absence of  non-tradable 
and intermediate goods in our calibrated model is likely to bias the overall magni-
tude of our quantitative results on welfare. As shown in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) 
the inclusion of  non-tradable goods lowers, while the inclusion of tradable inter-
mediate goods increases, the gains from trade, with the overall effects reducing the 
gains from trade by half. The effect should be milder for the gains from MP since 
MP is feasible in the  non-tradable sector (see Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare 2013). 
Although these considerations will affect the levels of welfare gains, we conjecture 
that, under standard assumptions, they should not affect our results on the distri-
bution of trade and MP gains (and loses) across countries, the impact of trade and 
MP on innovation, and the distribution of gains between production and innovation 
workers within countries.
29 We use the data published by the BEA website on local sales, sales to the United States, and sales to third 
countries of affiliates in manufacturing, by country. We choose the year 1999 for consistency with the BMP data 
used for the gravity estimates and because this is a benchmark survey year for which less data are imputed. 
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A. The Gains from Openness
Table 5 presents the gains from openness decomposed into the direct and indirect 
effects, as discussed in Section IE, as well as the gains from trade and MP, for a list 
of selected countries—the table with all countries is in the online Appendix. All 
countries gain from openness, and these gains are mostly driven by the direct effect. 
For countries that specialize in production, the direct effect is partially offset by a 
negative indirect effect—for example, Ireland has direct gains of 118 percent but 
indirect losses of 13 percent, resulting in a net overall gain of 90 percent.
The gains from MP and trade tend to be low, relative to the gains from openness, 
because trade and MP are substitutes: once an economy has access to either trade or 
MP, then adding the other channel does not generate large additional gains. Table 5 
shows that some countries with  r i < η actually lose from trade or MP. Focusing 
again on Ireland, we see that it experiences losses from trade of 1 percent, but gains 
from MP of 28 percent. The fact that some countries lose from trade or MP stands 
in contrast to Ramondo and  Rodríguez-Clare (2013), where gains from trade and 
gains from MP were always positive. As explained in Section IE, if inward MP costs 
are low relative to outward MP costs, lowering trade costs from infinity to their 
calibrated values (while leaving MP costs at their calibrated levels) would lead to 
a reallocation of resources from innovation to production, a  de-location effect that 
may increase prices as more ideas used in production must now bear the MP costs. 
Similarly, lowering MP costs from infinity to their calibrated values (while leaving 
trade costs at their calibrated levels) would lead to a decline in innovation, triggering 
a deterioration in the country’s terms of trade.
B. The Gains from MP Liberalization
We now quantify the overall gains and distributional effects from lowering all 
MP barriers by 5 percent. Table 6 shows the percentage changes for each country 
Table 5—Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP: Selected Countries,  
Baseline Calibration (Percent Change)
Gains from openness
Gains from trade Gains from MPOverall Direct Indirect(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Australia 20.7 42.2 −15.2 −7.6 11.7
Benelux 60.2 52.9 4.8 9.7 27.8
China 3.4 7.4 −3.7 −2.2 0.04
Germany 18.2 17.1 0.9 2.5 10.2
Hungary 44.0 73.0 −16.7 −5.2 16.3
Ireland 89.5 118.2 −13.2 −1.0 27.7
Mexico 16.7 22.4 −4.7 1.8 1.0
Turkey 5.8 6.8 −1.0 2.6 −0.5
United States 9.8 7.6 2.0 3.2 5.3
Average (all sample) 24.6 29.0 −2.9 3.6 7.0
Note: The gains from openness refer to changes in real expenditure between autarky and the calibrated equilibrium. 
The direct and indirect effects refer to the first and second terms, respectively, on the right-hand side of (27). The 
gains from trade (MP) refer to changes in real expenditure between an equilibrium with only MP (trade) and the 
calibrated equilibrium with both trade and MP. Changes are with respect to the baseline calibrated equilibrium with-
out trade and MP imbalances,  Δ = 0 .
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in innovation shares ( r i ), real expenditure ( X i / P i ), real wage in production ( w i p / P i ), 
and real wage in innovation ( w i e / P i ).
MP liberalization generates a large reallocation of innovation across countries. 
For example,  r increases more than 10 percent in Benelux, but falls by more than 
11 percent in Australia. These changes result from a combination of forces. When 
trade and MP costs decrease, we should see countries specializing according to their 
comparative advantage, but with positive trade and MP costs, HMEs are magnified, 
or weakened, as barriers decrease. In addition, there are third country effects: When 
a country is close to another country that has strong comparative advantage, MP 
liberalization may lead to a decline in its innovation share. In general, we should 
observe reallocation towards innovation in countries with  r > η , and the opposite in 
countries with  r < η . However, it is also important to consider whether innovation 
shares are low because of comparative advantage or HMEs. For instance, Ireland 
has  r < η , but when MP gets liberalized, it reallocates resources toward the innova-
tion sector. This is because Ireland has a comparative advantage in innovation.
It is worth noting that effects of MP liberalization are highly  non-linear. For 
instance, the strong increase in innovation in Benelux is caused by the fact that  γ is 
already low in that country; effects would be weaker if  γ were high.30
As measured by changes in aggregate real expenditure, countries experience aver-
age welfare gains of 1.93 percent from MP liberalization. The top winner is Benelux, 
with gains of 5.6 percent, while Turkey experiences a small loss. As explained in 
Section IE, aggregate loses arise because of the reallocation of resources from inno-
vation to production and the associated terms of trade, or  de-location, effects.
The distributional impact of MP liberalization are also shown in Table 6. The real 
wage for production workers increases with MP liberalization in all the countries in 
our sample. In contrast, changes in the real wage for innovation workers tend to fall 
with MP liberalization in countries which are net recipients of MP (i.e., with  r < η ). 
For example, real wages in innovation decrease by 3.4 percent in Mexico and by 
around 2.5 percent in China. More broadly, real wages in innovation tend to increase 
by more than real wages in production in countries with net MP outflows (i.e., with 
r > η ), whereas the opposite happens in countries with net MP inflows (i.e., with 
r < η ).
C. The Rise of the East
Arguably the single most important recent event relevant to the questions addressed 
in this paper is the emergence of China as a major center for manufacturing produc-
tion. We analyze how this may have affected innovation patterns across countries, as 
well as its overall welfare effects and distributional implications. Following up on 
the theoretical discussion in Section IE, we pay particular attention to the possibility 
of a negative effect on production workers in rich countries.
We consider three counterfactual exercises: (i) China reverting to autarky 
( τ l, CHN ′ ,  τ CHN, l ′ ,  γ i, CHN ′ ,  γ CHN, i ′ → ∞ for all  l ≠ CHN , and all  i ≠ CHN ); (ii) uni-
lateral MP liberalization of 10 percent into China (i.e.,  γ i, CHN ′ / γ i, CHN = 0.9 for 
30 In a symmetric world, we would not observe this  non-linear effects; the gains from MP liberalization would 
be, as a  first-order approximation, the product of the decline in  γ and MP flows. 
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all  i ≠ CHN ); and (iii) frictionless MP from the United States into China (i.e., 
γ USA, CHN ′ = 1 ). Table 7 presents the results for China, the United States, Japan, 
Mexico, and Ireland, using the baseline calibrated model.31
China in Autarky: Moving China back to autarky implies a reduction in the inno-
vation share for countries that are specialized in innovation. For example,  r falls 
by 2.5 percent in the United States and almost 2 percent in Japan. On the contrary, 
Mexico experiences an increase in  r . This might seem counterintuitive: if Mexico 
and China compete for inward MP, then it would be natural to expect China’s dis-
appearance from the scene to lead to more MP towards Mexico, causing deeper 
specialization in production and a decline in  r . The positive effect arises because 
innovation is a  non-rival activity, so that its decline in the United States leads to the 
creation of fewer US firms and lower MP flows to China and other locations.
Aggregate welfare falls everywhere and, as implied by the theory, the relative 
wage of innovation workers (i.e.,  w e / w p ) increases wherever there is an increase in 
the innovation share. In fact, the large increase in  w e / w p in China implies that inno-
vation workers benefit from moving to autarky. The real wage for production work-
ers falls even in countries that experience a decline in  r , such as the United States.
Unilateral MP Liberalization into China: The second counterfactual exercise 
involves a  10 percent decline in MP costs from all countries into China. This leads 
China to specialize even more in production while the United States and Japan 
31 Before proceeding, it is worth noting that our calibrated model matches well the trade and MP data for China. 
The values for inward MP shares, export and import shares, are virtually the same in the data and model; a discrep-
ancy is observed in outward MP shares (0.005 versus 0.01 in the model and data, respectively). 
Table 6—MP Liberalization: Selected Countries,  
Baseline Calibration (Percent Change)
  r   X/P  w p /P  w e /P 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia −11.49 3.40 3.83 −2.72
Benelux 10.63 5.61 4.17 11.08
China −5.33 0.26 0.70 −2.45
Germany 1.29 2.71 2.57 3.37
Hungary −14.80 3.76 4.24 −4.23
Ireland 7.52 4.94 4.60 8.81
Mexico −8.26 0.81 1.45 −3.44
Turkey −2.14 −0.01 0.20 −1.08
United States 0.75 1.32 1.23 1.70
Average (all sample) −2.00 1.93 2.01 0.88
Notes: MP liberalization refers to a 5 percent decrease in all MP costs with respect to the base-
line calibrated  values. The variables are: the innovation share,  r ; real expenditure,  X/P ; real wage 
per efficiency unit in the production sector,  w p /P ; real wage per efficiency unit in the innovation 
sector,  w e /P. Percentage changes are with respect to the baseline calibrated equilibrium without 
trade and MP imbalances,  Δ = 0 .
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 further specialize in innovation. In turn, higher innovation in the United States 
increases outward MP to Mexico, which deepens its specialization in production.
China experiences gains of 0.75 percent, and the other countries in Table 7 also 
gain, but some countries experience modest aggregate losses, such as Austria and 
Turkey (not shown). These are countries for which innovation activities decline, and 
hence, by the results in Section IE, they are candidates for welfare losses caused by 
the strengthening of HMEs due to MP liberalization in China. Specifically, countries 
that are initially well linked to China benefit disproportionately from the new MP 
opportunities generated by China’s liberalization, leading to a reallocation of inno-
vation toward these countries and away from countries with weak links to China, 
who may then suffer welfare losses.
Turning to the distributional implications, the gains from MP liberalization in 
China are captured by production workers, who see their real wage increased by 
almost 2 percent, while innovation workers actually experience losses of more 
than 5 percent. Contrary to popular fears, production workers gain in the United 
States, but their gains are less than one fifth of those of workers in the innovation 
sector.
Frictionless MP from the United States into China: The complete removal of 
MP frictions from the United States into China has major effects all over the world. 
First, there is a dramatic reallocation of innovation from China to the United States. 
Second, the increase in innovation in the United States leads to a strong displace-
ment of innovation away from countries with strong links to the United States, such 
as Ireland and Mexico. Third, there is a decline in innovation activities (and the real 
Table 7—The Rise of the East: Baseline Calibration
Percent changes
China United States Japan Mexico Ireland
China in autarky
 Innovation rate,  r 19.55 −2.53 −1.81 0.34 −0.79
 Real expenditure,  X/P −3.29 −0.76 −0.76 −0.11 −0.37
 Real production wage,  w p /P −4.84 −0.48 −0.57 −0.14 −0.33
 Real innovation wage,  w e /P 5.74 −2.03 −1.67 0.06 −0.76
Unilateral MP liberalization into China
 Innovation rate,  r −11.95 1.34 1.21 −0.25 0.58
 Real expenditure,  X/P 0.75 0.31 0.26 0.013 0.14
 Real production wage,  w p /P 1.73 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.12
 Real innovation wage,  w e /P −5.45 0.98 0.86 -0.11 0.43
Frictionless MP into China from USA
 Innovation rate,  r −92.25 21.87 −0.86 −3.36 −5.56
 Real expenditure,  X/P 34.20 4.85 0.0004 0.33 0.68
 Real production wage,  w p /P 43.88 2.27 0.09 0.59 0.92
 Real innovation wage,  w e /P −62.65 15.75 −0.43 −1.36 −2.16
Notes: China in autarky refers to the counterfactual scenario in which trade and MP costs from/to China are set to 
infinity; unilateral MP liberalization into China refers to the counterfactual scenario in which MP costs into China 
are decreased by 10 percent; frictionless MP into China from USA refers to the counterfactual scenario in which 
MP costs from the United States into China are set to one. The real wage in each sectors refers to the real wage 
per efficiency units. Percent changes are with respect to the baseline calibrated equilibrium without trade and MP 
imbalances,  Δ = 0 .
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wage for innovation workers) in other  high-innovation countries, such as Japan, for 
two reasons: these countries face much worse conditions for doing MP in China as 
production wages there increase by almost 45 percent thanks to the higher demand 
for labor by US multinational firms; and the increase in innovation activities in 
the United States leads their multinational firms to open foreign subsidiaries every-
where, extending the upward pressure in production wages to—and reducing the 
incentives for innovation in—the rest of the world.
Importantly, although there is a large reallocation of production by US multina-
tional firms to China, the fear that this may hurt US workers does not materialize in 
our calibrated model: both production and innovation workers in the United States 
experience increases in their real wage.
D. The Fall of the West
Motivated by Brexit, we first use our model to quantify the effects of a 5 percent 
increase in bilateral trade and MP costs between the United Kingdom and the coun-
tries in our sample that belong to the European Union. To highlight the separate role 
of the increase in MP costs, we perform the exercise in two steps: we first increase 
only trade costs by 5 percent, and then we increase simultaneously trade and MP 
costs by 5 percent. We find that while increasing barriers to trade with the European 
Union would reduce real expenditure in the United Kingdom by a percentage point, 
also increasing barriers to MP would more than triple the real expenditure losses. 
The innovation share would fall by 2.5 percent, and workers in the production and 
innovation sector would experience decreases in their real wage of 1.4 and 2.7 per-
cent, respectively. All EU members would lose from Brexit—particularly Ireland—
except for Italy that would experience small welfare gains.
Next, motivated by the idea of imposing taxes on US firms that reallocate (parts 
of) their production process to foreign locations, we consider a unilateral increase of 
20 percent in outward MP costs from the United States (i.e.,  γ USA, l ′ / γ USA, l = 1.20 , 
for all  l ≠ USA ). As shown in the online Appendix, this causes a reduction in the US 
innovation share of almost 20 percent. Both workers in the production and innova-
tion sectors would lose, but the losses of workers in the latter sector would be more 
than  six-time larger. Ireland and Mexico would both experience increases in their 
innovation shares but suffer aggregate welfare losses. Overall, countries with net 
positive MP flows (i.e.,  r > η ) tend to gain, while net recipients of MP (i.e.,  r < η ) 
tend to lose.
IV. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we present results for alternative calibrations with values for  ρ and 
κ that differ from our baseline calibration, and discuss the sensitivity of our results 
to the inclusion of fixed costs of operating plants in additional locations.
A. Alternative Calibrations
Two parameters have outsized roles in shaping the model’s quantitative implica-
tions. The parameter  ρ governs the heterogeneity of firms’ productivity draws across 
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production locations and so determines the efficiency gains associated with the relo-
cation of production internationally. The parameter  κ governs the heterogeneity of 
a worker’s efficiency draws across innovation and production and so determines the 
extent to which countries can be induced to specialize. In this section, we contrast 
the fit and the welfare implications of alternative parameterizations of  ρ and  κ with 
those of our benchmark calibration. The supporting tables can be found in the online 
Appendix.
To illustrate the role of  ρ we reconsider the model’s fit and counterfactual 
predictions when  ρ = 0 . Under this parameterization, it is easy to show that 
 X iln =  λ il M  λ ln T  X n , i.e., the aggregate export behavior of the foreign affiliates mimics 
the export behavior of domestic firms. There are two immediate implications for the 
model fit under this parameterization. First, the model will not generate trade elas-
ticities that differ between restricted and unrestricted gravity (they are both equal 
to  θ ), so it cannot match the target estimates from Section IIA. Still, upon recali-
brating trade and MP costs, the model calibrated with  ρ = 0 does as well as that 
calibrated with  ρ = 0.55 in matching the observed trade and MP flows. Second, the 
average BMP share predicted by the model rises from 5.5 to 27 percent, bringing it 
much closer to the 36 percent observed in the data.32 As explained in Section IIC, 
however, the  cross-country pattern of BMP is better captured by the model with 
ρ = 0.55 , as also implied by our aggregate estimates of the gravity elasticities.
The  cross-country pattern of the various effects we have focused on are not sig-
nificantly different across the calibrations with  ρ = 0 and  ρ = 0.55 . Specifically, the 
correlation between the two calibrations in the  country-level gains from openness, 
gains from trade and gains from MP are 0.93, 0.85, and 0.92, respectively, while 
the analogous correlation in the percentage change in  r ,  X/P ,  w p /P , and  w e /P , are 
0.88, 0.96, 0.96, and 0.86, respectively. Some differences emerge in  cross-country 
averages: the average gains from openness are 13 percent under  ρ = 0 , lower than 
the 25 percent for the case with  ρ = 0.55 , the average gains from MP are slightly 
lower (6 rather than 7 percent), the average gains from trade are slightly higher 
(5 rather than 4 percent), and the average gains from MP liberalization are lower 
(1.4 versus 1.9 percent).
Why is it that the calibration with  ρ = 0 delivers lower gains from openness than 
with  ρ = 0.55 ? Since the difference arises almost entirely from the direct gains, 
we can focus on the expression on the  right-hand side of (28). Even with  ρ = 0 the 
calibrated model implies that  ∑ l   X nln ≈  X nnn , and hence
  (  ∑ l 
  X nln  ______ ∑ i, l    X iln  ) 
− 1 _θ  (  X nnn  _____  ∑ l   X nln ) 
− 1−ρ _θ  ≈  (  X nnn  _ X n  ) 
− 1 _θ . 
Thus, we can focus on the implied value of the share  X nnn / X n under  ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.55 to understand the difference in the gains from openness between the two 
calibrations. Since BMP shares tend to be higher under  ρ = 0 but both models are 
32 This difference in the average BMP share between data and model is close to the difference in fit obtained by 
Tintelnot (2017) in the baseline calibration of his model with  plant-level fixed costs (50 percent in the data versus 
39.4 percent in the model). 
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calibrated to be consistent with the same trade and MP shares, it must be that domes-
tic firms tend to export less and produce more for the domestic market, implying a 
higher  X nnn / X n and lower gains from openness.
To illustrate the role of the parameter  κ , we consider the alternative value of 
κ = 5 .33 Not surprisingly, as  κ increases countries respond to shocks by becoming 
more specialized. The results for Benelux illustrate the point clearly: the increase in 
the innovation share triggered by MP liberalization increases from 11 percent with 
κ = 2 to almost 20 percent with  κ = 5 .
B.  Plant-Level Fixed Costs
As mentioned in the introduction, we have departed from the literature by assum-
ing that there are no fixed costs involved in setting up plants in additional locations. 
This approach has important advantages: (i) firm decisions aggregate up nicely so 
that we have analytical results for comparative statics and welfare; (ii) the model 
generates a gravity equation for trade flows by firms from one home country (our 
restricted gravity equation); and (iii) the calibration is transparent, as we can recover 
key restrictions on parameters with our restricted gravity equation and compute 
trade and MP costs from our extended Head-Ries approach. Still, it is important to 
discuss how the absence of a  proximity-concentration tradeoff (i.e., incurring trade 
costs, but concentrating production in one location, or incurring a  plant-level fixed 
cost to replicate production in another location closer to consumers) may be affect-
ing our results.
As we show in the online Appendix, under the special case with  ρ = 0 and if 
 plant-level fixed costs are not too high relative to marketing costs (a generalization 
of a condition imposed by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), then allowing for 
such fixed costs would not affect any of the conclusions we have derived in this 
paper. In essence, in this case, all that the  plant-level fixed costs do is to increase 
the productivity cutoff for selling in the market where the plant is located, exactly 
as if the marketing cost for selling there were higher. Since marketing costs have 
no effect on our counterfactuals, it follows that adding fixed costs does not affect 
them either. We acknowledge that the case with  ρ = 0 is quite special, but the iso-
morphism is important because it shows that the magnitude of any possible change 
caused by introducing  plant-level fixed costs depends on how far  ρ is from zero.
For  ρ > 0 the isomorphism breaks down and one must deal with firms facing a 
discrete choice problem with  2 N combinations of production locations to choose 
from. Such  firm-level decisions do not aggregate up into a set of equilibrium equa-
tions that we can directly use to conduct comparative statics, and the analysis must 
be done through simulation methods. Tintelnot (2017) addresses this challenging 
problem in the context of a model with a probabilistic structure that is similar to 
ours, but without innovation or marketing costs.34 He calibrates the model to match 
33 Because this case differs only in the specification of the labor market, the implied trade and MP costs, 
 T e s, and  T  p s, as well as the goodness of fit of the calibrated model, and the values of  ρ and  θ , are common across 
specifications. 
34 In the online Appendix, we formally show that the probabilistic setup in our model is isomorphic to the one in 
Tintelnot (2017) and Sun (2017), where each firm’s productivity in a location is the product of a  Pareto-distributed 
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moments associated with German  firm-level data as well as aggregate trade and MP 
flows. One key result of that paper is that BMP increases with  plant-level fixed costs. 
This is because those fixed costs lead to fewer and larger firms, with a lower average 
number of production plants and higher BMP.
Adding  plant-level fixed costs to our model, computing the equilibrium by fol-
lowing the techniques in Tintelnot (2017), and calibrating the model to make it 
consistent with the restricted and unrestricted trade elasticities as well as the average 
BMP shares is an important issue for future research. Here we can only offer the 
following conjecture: since either the case of positive  plant-level fixed costs or the 
case with no such costs and  ρ = 0 imply higher BMP shares relative to our baseline 
calibrated model with  ρ = 0.55 and no fixed costs, then their effect on counterfac-
tual implications may be similar. In that sense, the results discussed above for the 
alternative calibration with  ρ = 0 may be informative about the effect of adding 
 plant-level fixed costs.
V. Conclusion
The decline in the costs of multinational production (MP) has allowed some 
countries to specialize in innovation and others to specialize in the production of 
goods and services created elsewhere. To quantify the implications of this phenom-
enon, we develop a quantifiable general equilibrium model where firms can serve a 
market by exporting from their home country, by producing in the foreign market, 
or by exporting from a third location. In making their location decisions, firms face 
a  proximity-comparative advantage tradeoff: trade costs may induce firms to open 
foreign affiliates near to their foreign customers, but this proximity may imply not 
minimizing production costs. In the aggregate, countries that have a high produc-
tivity in innovation relative to production tend to specialize in innovation, but home 
market effects create forces to concentrate production in countries with large “mar-
ket potential” while drawing innovation towards countries with large “production 
potential.” The model yields simple structural expressions for bilateral trade and 
MP that we use in our calibration across a set of OECD countries. We use the cal-
ibrated model to perform a series of counterfactual exercises designed to study the 
welfare implications of shocks driving increased specialization in innovation and 
 production across countries. We find that countries that specialize in production due 
to HMEs may experience aggregate losses, although these losses tend to be very 
small. Contrary to popular fears, we find that production workers gain even in coun-
tries that further specialize in innovation.
Appendix A: Theory
A. Properties of the Multivariate Pareto
 (i) We show that with  ρ → 1 the elements of  z are perfectly correlated, i.e., 
lim ρ→1  G i ( z 1 , …,  z N ) = 1 −  max l  T il  z l −θ . Let  x ≡  max l  T il  z l −θ and note 
core productivity and a  location-specific  Fréchet-distributed efficiency shock, and  market-entry decisions are made 
before observing the  location-specific efficiencies. 
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that  G i (  z 1 , …,  z N )  = 1 − x  ( ∑ l=1 N  ( T il  z l −θ / x)  1 _ 1−ρ ) 1−ρ . As  ρ → 1 then 
∑ l=1 N  ( T il  z l −θ / x)  
1 _ 
1−ρ → 1 , proving the result.
 (ii) We also show that  ρ = 0 is equivalent to the case of the production loca-
tion  l chosen randomly with probabilities  T il /  T ̃i among all possible locations 
l = 1, …, N , and the productivity  Z l chosen from the Pareto distribution 
1 −  T ̃i  z l −θ with  z l ≥  T ̃ i 1/θ . We simply need to prove that for  l ≠ k we have 
 Pr ( Z l >  T  ̃i 1/θ ∩  Z k >  T ̃ i 1/θ )  = 0 , and  Pr ( Z l ≤  z l ∩  Z k =  T  ̃i 1/θ for all  k ≠ l ) =  ( T il /  T  ̃i ) (1 −  T ̃i  z l −θ ) . Note that with  ρ = 0 the density associated with the 
distribution above is zero, if it is evaluated at a point with  Z v >  T ̃ i 1/θ for two 
or more  v , while  Pr ( Z l ≤  z l ∩  Z k =  T ̃ i 1/θ for all  k ≠ l )  = 1 −  [ ∑ k≠l N  T ik /  T ̃i + 
T il  z l −θ ] =  ( T il /  T  ̃i ) (1 −  T ̃i  z l −θ ) proving the result.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The (unconditional) probability that a firm from  i will serve market  n from  l is
  Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l  ∩  min k  C ikn ≤  c n 
∗) . 
To compute this probability, note that
  Pr ( C i1n ≥  c i1n , …,  C iNn ≥  c iNn ) = Pr ( Z 1 ≤   ξ i1n  _ c i1n , …,  Z N ≤   ξ iNn  _ c iNn ) . 
Assuming that  c ikn ≤  ξ ikn  T ̃ i −1/θ for all  k , then our assumption regarding the distribu-
tion of  z for firms in country  i implies that
(A1)  Pr ( Z 1 ≤   ξ i1n  _ c i1n , … ,  Z N ≤   ξ iNn  _ c iNn ) = 1 −  ( ∑ k=1
N
  [ T ik  (  ξ ikn  _ c ikn ) 
−θ
 ] 
 1 _ 
1−ρ
 ) 
1−ρ
 . 
But we know that
 Pr ( C i1n ≥  c i1n , … ,  C iln =  c iln , … ,  C iNn ≥  c iNn ) = − ∂ Pr ( C i1n ≥  c i1n , … ,  C iln ≥  c iln , … ,   C iNn ≥  c iNn )     ____________________________∂ c iln  , 
hence from ( A1 ) we get
(A2)
 Pr ( C i1n ≥  c i1n , … ,  C iln =  c iln , … ,  C iNn ≥  c iNn ) = θ  ( ∑ 
k=1
N
  [ T ik  (  ξ ikn  _ c ikn ) 
−θ
 ] 
 1 ___ 1−ρ
 ) 
−ρ
  ( T il  ξ iln −θ )  1 ___ 1−ρ  c iln θ/ (1−ρ) −1 . 
Notice also that if  c <  ξ ikn  T  ̃i  −1/θ for all  k , and using the definition of  ψ iln ,
 Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l  ∩  min k  C ikn = c) = Pr ( C i1n ≥ c, … , C iln = c, … , C iNn ≥ c) 
 = θ  Ψ in − ρ _ 1−ρ  ( T il  ξ iln −θ )  1 _ 1−ρ  c θ−1 =  ψ iln  Ψ in θ  c θ−1 . 
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Given Assumption 1 we know that  c in ∗ <  ξ ikn  T ̃ i −1/θ so that we can integrate the pre-
vious expression over  c from  0 to  c n ∗ to show that the probability that firms from  i 
serving market  n will choose location  l for production is
(A3)  Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l  ∩  min k  C ikn ≤  c n 
∗) =  ψ iln  Ψ in  ( c n ∗) θ ,  
while
  Pr ( min k  C ikn ≤  c n ∗) =  ∑ k  ψ ikn  Ψ in  ( c n ∗) θ =  Ψ in  ( c n ∗) θ . 
Hence,
  Pr ( arg min k  C ikn = l |  min k  C ikn ≤  c n 
∗) =  ψ iln . ∎ 
C. Derivations of Equations (7) and (9)
Multiplying ( A3 ) by the measure of firms in  i ,  M i , and using ( 3 ), we get the mea-
sure of firms from  i that serve market  n from location  l ,
(A4)  M iln =  M i  ψ iln  Ψ in  ( σ  w n 
p  F n  _ X n  ) 
−θ/(σ−1)
   P n θ __ σ ̃ θ . 
Since the sales of a firm with cost  c in a market  n are  σ ̃ 1−σ  X n  P n σ−1  c 1−σ , equation ( 5 ) 
implies that total sales from  n to  l by firms from  i ,  X iln , are
  X iln =  M i  ψ iln  Ψ in  σ ̃ 1−σ  X n  P n σ−1 ∫ 0  c n ∗ θ  c θ−σ dc. 
Solving for the integral, using  (3) and simplifying yields
(A5)  X iln =   σ ̃ −θ θ _______ θ − σ + 1  M i  ψ iln  Ψ in  (σ  w n p  F n )  (θ−σ+1) /(1−σ)  X n θ/(σ−1)  P n θ . 
Combining (A5) and (A4) yields (9). In turn, the formula for the price index in  (1) 
together with the pricing rule in  (2) , the density in  (5) , and the  cut-off in  (3) imply 
that
(A6)  P n −θ =  ζ θ  (  w n 
p  F n  _ X n  ) 
1− θ _ σ−1  ∑ 
k
  M k  Ψ kn ,  
where  ζ ≡  (  σ ̃ 1−σ θ ______ θ − σ + 1) 
1/θ ( σ ___  σ ̃ 1−σ )  
σ−1−θ _____θ(σ−1) . Plugging this result into (A5), we obtain  (7) 
by noting that  λ in E is given by expression (8).
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Appendix B: Data
The production data for the restricted sample ( X iln , where  i = US) were assem-
bled from several sources that depend on the location of production  l . For the case 
of  l ≠ US (US MP abroad), our data are from the confidential 1999 survey of the 
BEA of US direct investment abroad. This legally mandatory survey identifies all 
US firms that own productive facilities abroad. The survey requires firms to report 
for their  majority-owned, manufacturing affiliates the location of the affiliates  l , the 
sales of these affiliates to customers in their host country ( l = n ), and their sales to 
customers in the United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and an aggre-
gation of a subset of countries in the European Union ( l ≠ US, n ).35 For the case 
of  l = US , the data was constructed using a mixture of publicly available data and 
a confidential survey conducted by the BEA on the activities of the US affiliates 
of foreign firms. Aggregate bilateral trade volumes in manufactures and aggregate 
domestic manufacturing sales were collected from Feenstra et al. (2002) and the 
Census of Manufacturing respectively. From these aggregates we subtracted the 
total contribution of foreign firms to these sales using the BEA dataset.
The data for the unrestricted sample ( ∑ i   X iln ) were also constructed using data 
from several sources. The bilateral trade data ( l ≠ n ) came from Feenstra, Romalis, 
and Schott (2002) for the year 1999. The domestic production data ( l = n ) was 
collected from the OECD for most developed countries, from the INSTAT database 
maintained by UNIDO for many of the developing countries, and for a few addi-
tional countries the domestic absorption data was obtained from the estimates found 
in Simonovska and Waugh (2013). In the estimation we use only those bilateral pair 
observations for which both  X iln and  X ln are both nonzero and  non-missing, yielding 
a sample of 316 observations.
The data for trade frictions was drawn from several sources. The raw tariff 
data was obtained from either the WTO or from WITS maintained by the World 
Bank. Tariffs applied by a given country  n can differ from their MFN levels across 
 exporting countries  l either because no tariff is applied, as when  n = l or  n and  l 
are both in a free trade agreement or customs union, or because country  n extends 
GSP tariffs to a developing country  l . Data for distance ( d ln ) and for the standard 
gravity controls ( H ln ) are from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et Informations 
Internationales (CEPII). To allow for  non-linearities in the effect of distance on 
trade cost, we constructed six categorical variables ( D1 through  D6 ) defined by the 
size of the distance.36 Finally, a dummy variable was included that takes a value of 
one for the case in which  l = n and a value of zero for the case  l ≠ n .
Appendix C: Calibration Procedure
The algorithm for calibration is divided in three steps explained below.
35 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The BEA data for affiliate exports contains information on the 
destination for only these four countries and for seven regions in total. Of these regions, only the European countries 
share a common tariff. 
36 The categories are less than 1,000 km, between 1,000 and 3,000 km, between 3,000 and 6,000 km, between 
6,000 and 9,000 km, between 9,000 and 12,000 km, and greater than 12,000 km. 
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Step 1: Given a value for  θ and  ρ , the data on absorption, trade flows, and MP 
flows, we use our model to obtain an implied set of trilateral flows  X iln . Having 
those trilateral flows, we can then apply a generalized  Head-Ries procedure to 
obtain estimates of (symmetric) trade and MP costs. Define  t il ≡  T   l p  ( w l  τ ln ) −θ and 
 g il ≡  M i  T i e  γ il −θ . Using (7), combined with (8) and the definitions of  ψ iln and  Ψ in , the 
set of trilateral flows  X iln can be written as
(C1)  X iln =  ( 
 g il  t ln   ______________ 
 [ ∑ k    ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ ) 
 1 _ 
1−ρ   [ ∑ k 
   ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ   ________________
 ∑ r    [ ∑ j   ( g rj  t jn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 1−ρ 
  X n . 
Using (10) and (11),  λ ln T and  λ il M , respectively, can also be written as a function 
of these variables:
(C2)  λ ln T =  ∑ 
i
  ( 
 g il  t ln   ______________ 
 [ ∑ k    ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ ) 
 1 _ 
1−ρ   [ ∑ k 
   ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ   ________________
 ∑ r    [ ∑ j   ( g rj  g jn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 1−ρ 
 
and
(C3)  λ il M =  1 _  Y l  ∑ n  ( 
 g il  t ln   ______________ 
 [ ∑ k    ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ ) 
 1 _ 
1−ρ   [ ∑ k 
   ( g ik  t kn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 
1−ρ   ________________
 ∑ r    [ ∑ j   ( g rj  t jn )  1 _ 1−ρ ] 1−ρ 
  X n ,  
where gross manufacturing output for country  l in the data is simply calculated 
using data on trade flows and absorption as  Y l =  ∑ n    λ ln T  X n . Using data on bilateral 
MP and trade shares, as well as absorption and gross manufacturing output, we can 
back up the set of  g il and  t ln from (C2) and (C3) and then use them to solve for  X iln 
in (C1).
Using the expression for  X iln in (A5) and assuming symmetry (i.e.,  τ ln =  τ nl 
and  γ il =  γ li ), we calculate
  τ ˆln  hr =  ( √ _  X inn  X ill _ X iln  X inl  )  
1−ρ _θ  ,  γ ˆ il hr =  ( √ _  X iin  X lln _ X iln  X lin  )  
1−ρ _θ  . 
Step 2: We set the parameters  T i e and  T i p to match  r i , with  T USA p =  T USA e = 1 , and 
Y i , with  Y USA = 1 , respectively. We calculate the innovation share  r i using the data 
on bilateral MP shares, absorption, and gross production calculated as explained 
above, as well as the equilibrium conditions of the model, labor market clearing, 
and free entry conditions. The labor market equilibrium in production is given by
  L i p  w i p =  1 __ σ ̃  Y i +  1 + θ − σ _σθ  X i , 
while the market clearing condition for innovation workers can be written as
  L i e  w i e = η  ∑ 
l
  λ il M  Y l . 
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Combining the two, we get the total labor income for country  i ,
  L i p  w i p +  L i e  w i e =  1 __ σ ̃  Y i +  1 + θ − σ _σθ  X i + η  ∑ l  λ il M  Y l , 
where output is directly calculated from the data using absorption and bilateral trade 
shares for country  l ,  Y l =  ∑ n    λ ln T  X n . The innovation share  r is simply given by
  r i = 1 −   L i 
p  w i p ___________   L i p  w i p +  L i e  w i e . 
Notice that the innovation share  r i is adjusted by the current account imbalance 
as implied by the data: We do not equate total (labor) income (i.e.,  L i p  w i p +  L i e  w i e ) 
to total expenditure (i.e.,  X i ), in a country. The online Appendix shows innovation 
shares,  r i , expenditure,  X i , output,  Y i , and the implied aggregate trade and MP imbal-
ances,  Δ i =  X i − ( L i p  w i p +  L i e  w i e ) , for each country in our sample.
Step 3: We iterate on the value of the parameter  θ such that we match the 
 unrestricted-gravity trade elasticity in the data, by estimating by OLS
  log  λ ln T =  β u log  τ ln +  D n +  S l +  u ln , 
where  λ ln T are the trade shares coming from the model’s simulations and  τ ln are the 
calibrated trade costs.
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